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THE ILLINOIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
ACT OF 1985: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL PROCEDURE
Stephen S. Morrill*
I. INTRODUCTION: A CRISIS BREEDS LEGISLATION
In the early 1970's, Illinois' and the entire nation2 experienced the beginning
of what has since been termed a "crisis" in the medical malpractice insurance
* Stephen S. Morrill, B.A., J.D., Northwestern University. Admitted to the Illinois bar,
Mr. Morrill served as Parliamentarian of the Illinois Senate and staffed the Senate Judiciary I
Committee during the 84th General Assembly. During the 1985 legislative session, he participated
in the negotiation and drafting that led to the Medical Malpractice Reform Act. The views
expressed in this article are his own.
1. See Illinois Insurance Laws Study Commission, Final Report to the Governor and the
79th General Assembly 47-60 (1970). In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
It is generally agreed that in the early 1970's what has been termed a medical mal-
practice insurance crisis existed in most jurisdictions in this country. The crisis re-
sulted from the increasing reluctance of insurance companies to write medical
malpractice insurance policies and the dramatic rise in premiums demanded by those
companies which continued to issue policies. The difficulty in obtaining insurance
at reasonable rates forced many health-care providers to curtail or cease to render
their services. The legislative response to this crisis sought to reduce the cost of
medical malpractice insurance and to insure its continued availability to providers
of health care.
Anderson v. Wagner, 79 111. 2d 295, 301, 402 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1979). See also Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 III. 2d 313, 332, 347 N.E.2d 736, 746 (1976) (Underwood, J., concurring
and dissenting).
2. Several governmental reports describe this crisis. See, e.g., American Bar Association,
Report of the Commission on Medical Professional Liability (1977); All Indus. Medical Mal-
practice Ins. Comm., The Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice (1975), reprinted in Hearing
on Examination of the Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 184
(1975). Courts, too, have acknowledged the crisis. See, e.g., DiAntonio v. Northampton-
Accomack Memorial, 628 F.2d 287, 290 (1980); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583, 570
P.2d 744, 751 (1977); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 158, 162, 695 P.2d
665, 680, 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 383, 385 (1985); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St.
2d 483, 494-95, 424 N.E.2d 586, 594 (1981). Finally, numerous commentators have written
about the crisis. See, e.g., Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977); Comment, Recent Medical
Malpractice Legislation, First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv. 655 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, First Checkup].
At least one state supreme court, on the other hand, has questioned the existence within
its own jurisdiction of any such crisis. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 873-74,
555 P.2d 399, 412-13 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). The existence of a crisis was
also debated in Nebraska. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 127, 256 N.W.2d 657, 674 (1977)
(While, J., dissenting).
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market. An increasing number of judgments and lawsuits alleging malpractice
against doctors, hospitals and other health care providers drove insurers to
raise premiums substantially and sometimes even to deny malpractice insur-
ance coverage altogether.' The situation threatened the delivery of health
care services in two respects: first, fees charged to patients increased as
physicians passed their ever-increasing insurance costs on to consumers; 4 and
second, a maldistribution of medical care resulted as physicians avoided
high-risk specialties5 or relocated to areas with lower insurance rates.'
State legislatures responded to the crisis by enacting substantive and
procedural measures intended to reduce the number of litigated claims and
the size of jury awards.7 One of the principal legislative enactments in many
3. In January of 1973, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare released a com-
prehensive study of medical malpractice in the United States which sought to identify and analyze
the problems and recommend solutions. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Medical Mal-
practice: Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973) [hereinafter cited
as HEW Report]. That report recognized an increase in both the number of malpractice claims
and in the size of awards and settlements. Id. at 6, 10. It also observed that medical malpractice
actions are more expensive to litigate and take longer to resolve than other personal injury
actions. Id. at II. Accord Mallor, A Cure for Plaintiffs Ills? 51 IND. L.J. 103, 104 (1975);
Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial Department of New
York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261, 265 (1974).
Because of the high cost of increased litigation, medical malpractice insurers began raising
premiums substantially. HEW Report, supra, at 13. Additionally, many carriers stopped writing
medical malpractice insurance policies altogether. Oregon Medical Ass'n v. Rawis, No. 421-496,
slip op. at I (Or. Cir. Ct. May 4, 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 276 Or. 1101, 557 P.2d 664
(1976) (finding that the number of national insurance carriers writing medical malpractice policies
decreased from approximately 85 to 5). But cf. HEW Report, supra, at 38-39 (finding malpractice
insurance currently available, but also recommending that insurance and medical groups develop
contingency plans in the event that insurance becomes unavailable in the normal market); Com-
ment, First Checkup, supra note 2, at 660-66 (noting that a majority of states have enacted
legislation to provide for liability insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable in the open
market). Increased litigation also has tempted some doctors to practice "defensive medicine."
HEW Report, supra, at 14-15; Roth, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Its Causes, The
Effects, and Proposed Solutions, 44 INs. COUNS. J. 469, 474 (1977). Such practice consists of
administering unnecessary diagnostic or therapeutic tests for the purpose of preventing or de-
fending against malpractice claims. Id.
The causes of this increased number of malpractice claims are varied and complex. The
prime cause, according to the HEW Report, is an increase in the number of patient injuries.
HEW Report, supra, at 24. Other causes include a general breakdown of the traditional doctor-
patient relationship, unrealistic expectations aroused by the media concerning the availability of
cures for many illnesses, and greater litigiousness on the part of the public. See generally HEW
Report, supra, at 25; Comment, First Checkup, supra note 2, at 655-60.
4. See HEW Report, supra note 3, at 12-13; Note, Introduction: The Indiana Act in Con-
text, 51 IND. L.J. 91, 93 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Indiana Act].
5. See Redish, supra note 2, at 760; Note, Indiana Act, supra note 4, at 93.
6. See Halpern v. Gozen, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 755, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (Sup. Ct. 1976);
Redish, supra note 2, at 760; Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 467, 469-70 (1975).
7. Legislation aimed solely at medical malpractice claims has included imposition of ceilings
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states8 was the creation of extra-judicial pre-trial panels composed of doctors,
on the amount of collectible damages; elimination of the "collateral source rule," the doctrine
which prevents deductions from damage awards of payments received by an injured patient from
his own insurance or other collateral sources; clarification of the doctrine of "informed con-
sent," a theory of liability based on a physician's failure to adequately disclose to the patient
the risks of treatment; elimination of claims based on failure to achieve guaranteed results unless
the promise was made in writing; restrictions on the use of res ipsa loquitur as a means of
establishing negligence; reduction of the limitations period within which claims may be brought;
prohibition in the pleadings of ad damnum clauses and imposition of ceilings on attorney's
contingent fee arrangements.
8. Twenty-seven states currently have special medical malpractice statutes that create pre-
trial screening panels. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (1985 Cum. Supp.) (voluntary binding arbitration
authorized); ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.536 (1984) (court may appoint expert advisory panel to help
screen case; findings admissible at trial; voluntary binding arbitration allowed); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-567 (1985 Cum. Supp.) (review panel determination is non-binding but admissible at
trial; panel may be waived by unanimous agreement of parties or where damages are agreed to
be less than $50,000) (constitutionality upheld, Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d
744 (1977)); CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 12995 (Deering 1985 Cum. Supp.) (arbitration clauses in
medical service contracts permitted); CONN. GENi. STAT. § 38-196-f (1985 Cum. Supp.) (voluntary
non-binding panel authorized if all parties agree; findings admissible at trial); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 6802-6814 (1984 Cum. Supp.) (any party may convene a screening panel); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 768.44, 768.47 (West 1982) (mandatory panels; conclusions are admissible while findings
are not) (constitutionality upheld, Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976)); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 to 671-19 (1984 Supp.) (mandatory panels; findings neither binding nor
admissible); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1001 to 6-1011 (1984 Cum. Supp.) (compulsory non-binding panels;
results not admissible); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1013 et seq. (1983) (see infra notes 25-39
and accompanying text), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 201-214 (1983) (voluntary arbitration agree-
ments permitted in medical service contracts); IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5 - 9-2 (1981 Cum. Supp.)
(mandatory panels; conclusions admissible) (constitutionality upheld, Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4901 - 65-4908 (1984)
(any party or judge may request panel; fimdings not admissible); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.47
(West 1985) (mandatory panels; conclusions admissible) (constitutionality upheld, Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2801 - 2809 (1985 Cum.
Supp.) (one party may request panel; findings inadmissible); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-2A-03 - 3-2A-06 (1980) (mandatory non-binding panels; findings admissible; burden
on party rejecting panel award) (constitutionality upheld, Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md.
274, 385 A. 2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978)); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1980) (mandatory tribunal) (constitutionality upheld, Paro v. Longwood
Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3053 et seq.
(West 1985 Cum. Supp.) (arbitration agreement must be offered to patient) (constitutionality
upheld, Morris v. Metriyakoal, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981)); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-6-101 et seq. (1983) (mandatory non-binding panels; findings not admissible) (con-
stitutionality upheld, Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840
(1984) (mandatory non-binding panels; findings admissible) (constitutionality upheld, Prender-
gast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977)); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:30 D-3 et seq. (1984)
(mandatory review panel; findings admissible at trial and not subject to cross-examination) (con-
stitutionality upheld, Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N.J. Super. 407, 423 A.2d 670 (1980)); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 148-a (McKinney 1984) (mandatory panels; unanimous recommendations admissible at trial)
(constitutionality upheld, Comisky v. Arlen, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200
(1976)); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page 1984) (mandatory law arbitration board; opinion
admissible) (constitutionality upheld, Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424
19851
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attorneys, judges and laymen for the consideration of medical malpractice
claims. Such panels, variously termed screening, mediation, review, advisory,
hearing or arbitration panels, informally determine before trial whether a
plaintiff's claim has merit. The panels are intended to facilitate early settle-
ment of meritorious claims and to discourage the prosecution of groundless
suits. The desired result is a reduction in the time and expense associated
with the litigation of medical malpractice actions in the courts. 9
In 1975, the Illinois General Assembly enacted legislation requiring that,
as a precondition to court trial, all medical malpractice claims must be
N.E.2d 586 (1981)), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.24 (Page 1984) (arbitration agreement form
with patient's right to cancel); 1301 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 308, 309, 510 (Purdon 1985)
(voluntary arbitration panels convened upon agreement of all parties; panel decision admissible)
(constitutionality upheld, Parker v. Children's Mem. Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932
(1978)); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-104, 29-16-112 (1985 Supp.) (mandatory review board waiv-
able if all parties agree; board decision admissible); 1985 Utah Laws 78-14-12 et seq. (mandatory
non-binding informal panel); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (1985 Cum. Supp.) (voluntary
arbitration); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 et seq. (1985 Cum. Supp.) (optional panel; opinion ad-
missible) (constitutionality upheld, DeAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial, 628 F.2d
287 (4th Cir. (1980)); Wis. STAT. § 655.02 et seq. (1985 Cum. Supp.) (mandatory panel; parties
can stipulate that panels will be binding; formal panel opinion admissible, informal panel opinion
not admissible) (constitutionality upheld, State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)).
Three other states have recently repealed medical review panel acts. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
34-2603 - 2607 (1985 Cum. Supp.) (plaintiff may voluntarily bring claim before hearing panel;
decision binding only if parties agree) (repealed by 1985 Ark. Acts, No. 8044, § 17); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41A.040 (1979) (mandatory panels) (repealed by 1981 Nev. Stat. 327); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-29.1 (1985 Cum. Supp.) (review panels) (repealed by 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 358, § I).
Additionally, five review panel statutes have been found to be unconstitutional in whole or
part. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (certain provisions of panel statute uncon-
stitutional on limited grounds relating to jurisdiction); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n,
63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (panel statute unconstitutional); Cardinal Glennon Mem.
Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (mandatory review board statute, with findings
inadmissible, unconstitutional); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (pro-
vision giving arbitration panel original, exclusive jurisdiction over all medical malpractice cases
held unconstitutional); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (preliminary hearing statute
requiring judge to dismiss case if he finds injury "merely an unfortunate medical result" un-
constitutional).
Finally, seventeen states have never enacted medical review panel legislation. The states are
Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia and Wyoming. See generally Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1418-55; Comment, First Checkup, supra
note 2, at 666-79.
9. See HEW Report, supra note 3, at 91. Reductions in the overall frequency and costs of
malpractice litigation should result in lower insurance premiums for health care providers and
thereby help maintain the quality and quantity of health services. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
591 F.2d 1164, 1174 (5th Cir. 1979); Roth, supra note 3, at 497; Comment, First Checkup, supra
note 2, at 679.
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reviewed by a panel consisting of a judge, a lawyer and a physician."'
Although similar legislation has been upheld in several jurisdictions,' man-
datory review panels did not fare well in Illinois.' 2 The Illinois Supreme
Court declared the 1975 statute unconstitutional as constituting special leg-
islation and as vesting judicial power in non-judges.' 3 Shortly after that
decision, the General Assembly established a doctor-owned "Illinois State
Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange,"' ' 4 which seemed to solve some of the
10. "An Act to revise the law in relation to medical malpractice," P.A. 79-960, 1975 Laws
of Illinois 2888. The statute was codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2 - 58.10 (1975).
Public Act 79-960 required all medical malpractice claims, as a condition precedent to court
trial, to proceed before a medical review panel consisting of a judge, a lawyer and a physician;
provided for a $500,000 cap on recoveries in all medical malpractice suits; and required each
medical malpractice insurer to renew coverage at rates it charged on June 10, 1975, unless the
company could justify a proposed increase with information provided to the Director of In-
surance and at a public hearing.
11. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5,
652 S.W.2d 836 (1983); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976); McCarthy v. Mensch,
412 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1982); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979) (Florida
statute); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Hines v. Elkhart
Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (D. Ind. 1979) (Indiana statute); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.
2d 1256 (La. 1978); Butler v. Flint-Goodridge Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 354 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct.
App. 1978); Seoane v. Ortho Pharma., Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981) (Louisiana statute);
Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978);
Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp.
v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981); Pren-
dergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N.J. Super. 407,
423 A.2d 670 (1980); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d
696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1976); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483,
424 N.E.2d 586 (1981); Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978);
DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial, 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia statute);
State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.E.2d 434 (1978).
12. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). In dis-
cussing its Wright decision, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that "an overwhelming
majority of courts have recognized the unique nature of medical malpractice and have upheld
general medical malpractice statutes against numerous constitutional attacks." Anderson v. Wag-
ner, 79 III. 2d 295, 303, 402 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1979).
13. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 332, 347 N.E.2d 736, 746 (1976).
14. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.201 et seq. (1983). Since 1976, the General Assembly
enacted three other measures to help mitigate medical malpractice problems. The first statute,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-212 (1983), shortened the applicable statute of limitations, requiring
a medical malpractice suit to be brought within two years after the victims knew or should have
known about the harm and, more importantly, within four years after the act causing the harm,
regardless of when discovered. There are two exceptions: (a) if the plaintiff is under 18 or
otherwise under a legal disability, the statute does not begin to run until after the person's
minority or other disability (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-212 (1983)); and (b) if the person
liable for medical malpractice fraudulently conceals information about the harm, the victim can
bring suit within five years after learning about the harm (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, § 13-215
(1983)). The second statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. i 10, § 2-1205 (1983), revised the so-called "col-
lateral source rule," providing that awards shall be reduced by 50% of collateral source benefits
for the injury, so long as the reduction does not exceed 50% of the judgment rendered on the
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insurance availability problems of the mid-1970s. 5
As Illinois legislators convened the 1985 regular session, a renewed cam-
paign for medical malpractice reform was well underway. Reports commis-
sioned by state and national medical groups claimed that the increasing costs
of medical malpractice insurance had begun to reach unaffordable levels.16
One American Medical Association report described the situation as follows:
[P]hysicians' costs for professional liability insurance protection have risen
to extraordinary levels in many areas, threatening to divert some physicians
out of their major specialties and barring young physicians from practicing
in places or specialties where premiums are especially high. The effect of
today's professional liability climate is to restrict patients' access to quality
medical care."
In Illinois, the Governor's Task Force on Medical Malpractice held a series
of public hearings in early 1985 and issued a report which concluded that
"Illinois is accelerating through the first stages of a crisis in medical mal-
practice" and suggested a lengthy series of statutory reforms to Illinois
medical malpractice law."
Before the end of the legislative session, the General Assembly approved
three measures that (1) contained a series of procedural and substantive
reforms to medical malpractice claim law;'9 (2) provided civil immunity to
hospital personnel for their participation in certain disciplinary proceedings; 20
(3) permitted the Illinois State Medical Disciplinary Board, upon a showing
of a possible violation of the Medical Practices Act, to compel a licensee or
applicant to submiI to physical and psychological examinations; 2' and (4)
required professional liability insurers to file annual reports with the Illinois
Department of Insurance detailing their insurance experience for the prior
year. 22 The principal measure, Public Act 84-7, provided for a mandatory
verdict. The third statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1113 (1983), permitted voluntary agree-
ments in medical services contracts to arbitrate medical malpractice claims.
15. See Report of the Task Force on Medical Malpractice to Governor James R. Thompson
9-11 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Report of Task Forcel.
16. See, e.g., American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional Liability
and Insurance: Report II. Professional Liability in the '80's 3 (November 1984) (detailing costs
of medical malpractice insurance and noting trends).
17. American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional Liability and Insur-
ance: Report 1, Professional Liability in the '80's 3 (October 1984).
18. See Report of Task Force, supra note 15, at 3, 4-13 (1985). The full paragraph stated:
The Governor's Task Force on Medical Malpractice finds that Illinois is accelerating
through the first stages of a crisis in medical malpractice and today stands on the
edge of a medical system that is beginning to deteriorate dramatically. In the absence
of immediate action by the legislature, the problems of medical malpractice will
permanently change . . . the availability of necessary health care.
Id. at 3.
19. P.A. 84-7, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 8 (West).
20. P.A. 84-164, 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 128 (West).
21. Id.
22. P.A. 84-201, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 163 (West).
[Vol. 35:345
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medical review panel procedure" similar to that held unconstitutional by the
Illinois Supreme Court in 1976.24
Under the new Illinois act, all medical malpractice cases25 must proceed
before a medical review panel composed of a judge, lawyer and physician 26
as a condition precedent to court trial, 27 unless waived by unanimous agree-
ment of the parties. 28 The parties may at any time unanimously elect to be
bound by the panel decision.2 9 Panel decisions are not admissible at trial as
evidence of liability or damages, but are admissible at hearings examining
the propriety of the prosecution or defense. 0 When a party rejects a unan-
imous panel decision and then loses on the issue of liability at trial, the
court upon motion shall assess against the rejecting party those costs and
fees incurred by the prevailing party in connection with the panel proceeding
and the trial."
In addition, Public Act 84-7 details the procedures to be followed in
forming a pane3 2 and in conducting a panel hearing." The act provides time
limits for panel actionl and grants absolute civil immunity to panel members
for actions in the course of their duties." The act empowers panel members
to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and also to issue subpoenas and
23. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1010 et seq., 1985 Il1. Legis. Serv. I I (West).
24. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
25. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1012, 1985 Il. Legis. Serv. II (West).
26. P.A. 84-7, §§ 2-1013, 2-1014, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 11-12 (West). A prospective panel
member must disqualify himself if he is "materially" associated with any party, attorney or
health care professional involved in the case. P.A. 84-7, § 1015(0, 1985 Il1. Legis. Serv. 14
(West).
27. P.A. 84-7, §§ 2-1012, 2-1018(d), 1985 Il. Legis. Serv. II, 16 (West).
28. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1012, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. I I (West).
29. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018(a), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 16 (West). A party who does not file a
written rejection with the circuit court clerk within 28 days of receiving service of the panel
determination is deemed to have accepted the decision. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018(b), 1985 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 16 (West).
30. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018(d), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 16 (West).
31. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1019(c), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 17 (West).
32. P.A. 84-7, §§ 2-1013, 2-1014 and 2-1015, 1985 Ill. Leg. Serv. 11-16 (West), provides for
selection of panel members from rotating rosters of judges, lawyers and health professionals.
P.A. 84-7, § 2-1015, 1985 Il. Legis. Serv. 14 (West), prohibits panel participation by persons
with a conflict of interest and permits prospective panel members to disqualify themselves with-
out cause.
33. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1016, 1985 I11. Legis. Serv. (West), states that the Code of Civil Procedure
"shall be followed insofar as practicable." The section also permits panel members to examine
and cross-examine witnesses and to call their own witnesses.
34. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1013, 1985 111. Legis. Serv. II (West), provides the following time limits:
(a) the court shall order a panel convened no longer than 90 days after the parties are at issue
on the pleadings; (b) the panel shall convene within 120 days of such order; (c) the panel shall
render its decision within 180 days after convening; and (d) the decision period may, upon the
ruling of the judicial member, be extended up to a maximum of 180 days.
35. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1016, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 15 (West).
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call their own witnesses. 6 Panels are required to file written decisions, in
which the judge states his conclusions of law and the panel its conclusions
of fact. Dissents are also permitted.17 Provision is made for compensating
non-judicial members, " and the Illinois Supreme Court is expressly granted
authority to adopt rules governing panel operation. 9
Within minutes after Governor Thompson signed Public Act 84-7 into
law,4° a complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking
to have the legislation declared unconstitutional. 4' A seven-day evidentiary
hearing was held before Circuit Court Judge Joseph M. Wosik, who declared
much of the act unconstitutional.4 1 Judge Wosik found the review panel
procedure unconstitutional because it (1) vests judicial power in non-judges,
(2) provides for review by trials de novo, (3) creates fee officers, (4) deprives
malpractice litigants due process of law, (5) violates state and federal equal
protection guarantees, (6) constitutes special legislation, (7) deprives mal-
practice litigants of access to the courts, and (8) denies malpractice plaintiffs
the right to trial by jury.43 After oral arguments in March of this year [19861,
the decision is now pending in the Illinois Supreme Court."4
This article examines the constitutionality of the medical review panel
procedure contained in Public Act 84-7. Particularly, the article measures
the panel provisions against the requirements of the Judicial Article of the
Illinois Constitution,4 and the protections afforded by the due process 46 and
equal protection4 7 clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions.
Additionally, the article examines whether the panel provisions constitute
special legislation in contravention of the Illinois Constitution4" or infringe
upon the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Illinois and United States
Constitutions.4 9 As political scientist Paul Starr has observed, "A crisis can
be a truly marvelous mechanism for the withdrawal or suspension of estab-
lished rights, and the acquisition and legitimation of new privileges." 5"
36. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1016(b), 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 15 (West).
37. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1017(a), 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 16 (West).
38. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1019, 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 17 (West).
39. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1020, 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 17 (West).
40. See Chicago Sun Times, June 26, 1985, at 20, col. I.
41. Complaint, Bernier v. Burris, 85 CH 6627 (filed June 25, 1985).
42. Judge Wosik's full decision is reprinted in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1985,
at 2.
43. Bernier v. Burris, 85 CH 6625, Trial Court Conclusion A-I (filed June 25, 1985), re-
printed in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1985, at 2, II.
44. Docket No. 62876. Oral argument is scheduled for March 27, 1986.
45. See infra notes 53-99 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 100-119 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 120-204 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 205-216 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 217-311 and accompanying text.
50. Quoted in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 168, 695 P.2d 665, 687,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 390 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins & Schweinfurth, Cal-
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Throughout this analysis, recognition is given to the existence of something
of a crisis in the medical malpractice insurance market,' and to the fact
that medical malpractice continues to occur. 2 However severe the crisis may
be, legislative responses must nevertheless fall within constitutional param-
eters.
II. THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Article VI of the Illinois Constitution establishes the judicial branch of
the state government and contains several prohibitions which, with respect
to the medical review panel created by Public Act 84-7, give rise to the
following three questions. First, do the panel provisions give judicial power
to non-judges in violation of Article VI, section 1?" Second, do the panel
provisions divest the circuit court of original jurisdiction over medical mal-
practice cases and thereby provide for review by trials de novo in violation
of Article VI, section 9? s4 And third, do the panel provisions create fee
officers in violation of Article VI, section 14?" This section addresses these
questions.
A. Encroachment on the Judicial Function
The Illinois Constitution vests judicial power in the courts alone. 6 An
issue raised by the review panel provisions of Public Act 84-7 is whether the
ifornia's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 So.
CAL. L. REV. 829, 935 (1979)).
51. Apparently rejecting the conclusions of the Report of Task Force, supra note 15, which
was submitted as evidence of the "crisis" by the Attorney General, Judge Wosik determined
that "there was no need for the challenged provisions of the legislation... [because] there is
no empirical data to support the claim that a medical malpractice insurance crisis exists in the
State of Illinois." Bernier v. Burris, 85 CH 6625, Trial Court No. A-I (filed June 23, 1985),
reprinted in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1985, at 2.
52. See, e.g., The Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1985, at BI, col. I; The State Journal Register
(Springfield, III.), Mar. 23, 1985, at 6; The Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1985, at BI, col. 1; The
State Journal Register (Springfield, III), Mar. 9, 1985, at 6, col. 1; The New York Times, Mar.
10, 1985, at 22, col. 1; The Chicago Tribune, Mar. 24, 1985, at 1, col. I; The Chicago Tribune,
Mar. 22, 1985, at 10, col. 2; The Miami Herald, Mar. 10, 1985, at 4E, col. I. See Statement
of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Hearings on Medical Malpractice Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House Ways and Means Comm., 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 28,
1984) (statement of Thomas Bendorf).
53. ILL. CO NST. art. VI, § I (1970) provides that "It]he judicial power is vested in a Supreme
Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."
54. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (1970) provides:
Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when
the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of
the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office.
Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as is provided
by law.
55. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1970) states that "[t]here shall be no fee officers in the judicial
system."
56. See supra note 53.
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utilization of both laypersons and judges in an apparently adjudicative role
violates the sphere of authority reserved exclusively for the judiciary. The
answer to that query can only be distilled from a careful analysis of the
powers exercised by a medical review panel.57
Several types of governmental powers are not involved in the review panel
process. First, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated, medical review
panels do not exercise legislative authority.5" Second, though perhaps less
obvious, panels do not exercise the "quasi-judicial" authority of an admin-
strative agency. 9 Administrative adjudicative power is incidental to an ex-
ecutive department's primary duty to administer and enforce a sufficiently
detailed statute over which the legislature has given it authority.60 Medical
57. For a similar analysis, see Comment, The Constitutional Considerations of Medical Mal-
practice Screening Panels, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 161, 173-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Screening Panelsl.
58. In Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 657, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991-92 (1977), up-
holding a review panel statute, the Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote:
ITlhe tribunal procedure, in its role as a first step in obtaining judicial access, does
not function as part of the legislative department, but as part of the judicial de-
partment. The role of the tribunal in hearing the plaintiff's offer of proof, receiving
evidence, and determining the legal sufficiency of the claim, is a part of the judicial
process at the preliminary stages of an action seeking damages for alleged medical
malpractice. The tribunal's intimate connection with the judicial proceeding makes
it clear that the hearing procedure is itself a part of the judicial process.
59. Administrative agencies frequently exercise what has been described as "quasi-judicial"
authority. In Devine v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 Ill. 504, 510, 110 N.E. 780, 782
(1915) (quoting State v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 246 III. 188, 231, 92 N.E. 81, 833 (1910)),
the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
Administrative and executive officers are frequently called upon, in the performance
of their duties, to exercise judgment and discretion, and yet it has been held that
they do not exercise judicial power, within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision. . . . The power exercised is ministerial or executive, but as an incident to it
the official is called upon to perform acts which are in their nature judicial,-very
nearly akin to those exercised by the courts. Such powers, when conferred upon
other officials than judges, are often termed quasi-judicial or discretionary. They
are said to "lie midway between the judicial and ministerial ones. The lines sepa-
rating them from such as are thus on their two sides are necessarily indistinct, but
in general terms, when the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer
the duty of looking into facts and acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically
directs but after a discretion in its nature judicial, the function is termed quasi-
judicial."
(Emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 414 Ill. 89, 97, 110 N.E.2d 234, 238
(1953) ("We have said many times that an administrative officer empowered to issue and revoke
licenses to engage in a business or profession necessarily exercises quasi-judicial powers, but such
exercise is incidental to the duty of administering the law relating to the regulation of a particular
business or calling and does not constitute the exercise of judicial power within the prohibition
of the Constitution"). See also Department of Finance v. Gandolfi, 375 111. 237, 240, 30 N.E.2d
737, 739 (1940) (enabling act of Department); Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 291 111. 167, 176, 125 N.E. 748, 752 (1919) (Workmen's Compensation Act).
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review panels, on the other hand, are directly interposed into an established
judicial scheme to which litigants have access by constitutional right, 6 and
over which the panels have no authority. Additionally, the relationship
between a review panel and the courts differs from that between an admin-
istrative agency and the courts. Public Act 84-7 permits a party who is
dissatisfied with the panel determination to "proceed to trial as in any other
civil case."162 In contrast, judicial review of an administrative proceeding is
generally confined to determining whether the legislative delegation of power
is valid, whether the administrative body acted within the scope of that
power, and whether the decision of the agency is arbitrary or capricious. 63
Furthermore, an administrative body's factual findings are taken as conclu-
sive if reasonably supported by the evidence.6 The findings of a review panel
are not conclusive and binding on the court; medical malpractice litigants
under Public Act 84-7 may proceed to a trial that will be based upon a
newly-created record. 65
Because medical review panels are part of neither the executive nor leg-
islative branch, they must be part of the judicial process.6 The panels do
not, however, exercise full judicial power. Although authorized to perform
many judge-like functions, 67 they are not empowered to render and enforce
61. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1970).
62. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018(d), 1985 111. Legis. Serv. 16 (West).
63. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. II (1944) (Board determination
that newsboys are "employees" within delegated powers and warranted by record). See also 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1970) (proiding for limited review of administrative agency findings).
64. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (agency determination
upheld where supported by substantial evidence).
65. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018, 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 16 (West). Indeed, the review panel deter-
mination is not even admissible as evidence of liability or damages in the court trial. P.A. 84-
7, § 2-1018(d), 1985 I11. Legis. Serv. 16 (West). The determination is, however, "admissible as
evidence in any hearing or trial where the issues concern the propriety of the prosecution or
defense of the claim reviewed by the panel as opposed to the claim itself." Id.
66. See supra note 58. Accord Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807-08 (Fla. 1976)
(England, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
Ass'n, 63 111. 2d 313, 322, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-40 (1976).
67. "The panel shall . .. proceed as a body to hear evidence and argument on the question
of liability and on the question of damages." P.A. 84-7, § 2-1016(a), 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 15
(West). "The panel shall have the power of subpoena ... [and) may call witnesses, examine
evidence, call for additional or particular evidence, and may examine or cross examine wit-
nesses." P.A. 84-7, § 2-1016(b), 1985 111. Legis. Serv. 15 (West). "The panel shall make its
determination ...on the issue of liability and, if liability is found, on the issue of fair and
just compensation for damages ... in a written opinion." P.A. 84-7, § 2-1017(a), 1985 Ill. Leg.
Serv. 16 (West).
Similar authority was given the coroner's jury in a statute upheld as not vesting judicial
power in non-judges. Devine v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 III. 504, 110 N.E. 780
(1915). In that decision, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
While the duties and functions of such jury are of a judicial nature to the extent
that they are authorized to inquire into and investigate how, by whom, and in what
1985]
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a final judgment.6" Instead, review panels issue "determinations" which
courts may convert into judgments only upon the unanimous agreement of
the parties. 69 This circumscribed authority granted to review panels falls short
of what the Illinois Supreme Court has described as judicial power:
The power involves not only the power to hear and determine a cause,
but also the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine the rights
of the parties to the controversy and to render a judgment or decree which
will be effectual and binding upon them in respect to their personal or
property rights in controversy in such proceedings. The power to hear
without the power also to adjudicate and determine the rights of the parties
to such proceedings cannot be said to be the exercise of judicial power as
that term is used in the Constitution of this state.7"
Nevertheless, in the highly-criticized" decision of Wright v. Central DuPage
manner the deceased came to his death and of all the facts and circumstances con-
nected with or in any manner related to or connected with such person's death, and
may subpoena and examine witnesses under oath for that purpose, they have no
power, on such hearing, to adjudicate and determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties growing out of the matter under investigation by them, and their finding has
none of the attributes of a judgment or decree.
Id. at 511, 110 N.E.2d at 785.
68. Such authority has been described as the "essence of judicial power." DiAntonio v.
Northampton-Accomade Memorial, 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 1980); Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d
1171, 1178 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (pre-trial screening panels do not encroach on essential powers
of court). See also Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 582, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977) ("Judicial
power is the power of the court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect
between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision") (quoting Stuart v. Norviel,
26 Ariz. 493, 501, 226 P.2d 908, 910 (1924)); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 287,
385 A.2d 57, 65 (1978) ("It is elementary that an entity does not exercise the sovereign power
of the State constitutionally assigned to the judiciary if its decision is in no sense final, binding
or enforceable; no power of any meaningful kind inheres in a decision which, as in the Act
before us, need not be accepted and which, if accepted, cannot be enforced by the entity which
made it").
69. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018, 1985 111. Legis. Serv. 16 (West). Cf. Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d
478, 490, 283 N.E.2d 474, 480-81 (1972) (mandatory small claims mediation procedure uncon-
stitutional). The court wrote:
Under the provisions of Section 609 the award of the arbitrator "must be entered
by the court in its record of judgments, and has the effect of a judgment upon the
parties unless reversed on appeal." Such a procedure cannot be likened to pretrial
procedures. By the terms of the statute it is a judgment which is being reviewed.
70. Devine v. Brunswick-Balkie-Collender Co., 270 111. 504, 511, 110 N.E. 780, 783 (1915)
(coroner and coroner's jury, empowered by statute to determine cause of death, do not exercise
judicial powers). See also People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 I1. 2d 332, 348, 118 N.E.2d
262, 270 (1954) (judicial participation in pre-trial counseling in divorce actions not the exercise
of judicial power).
71. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 2; Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 322 (1977); Note, Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital
-Association: A Grim Prognosis for Medical Malpractice Review Panels? 22 S.D.L. REv. 461
(1977); Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 TENN.
L. REV. 607 (1979); Comment, First Checkup, supra note 2.
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Hospital Association,72 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a review panel
statute unconstitutionally vested judicial powers in non-judges even though
the panel decision had no binding force absent the agreement of the parties."
In analyzing the 1975 statute, the court emphasized the ability of lay panel
members to determine the applicable law, even over the objections of the
judicial panel member. As the court explained:
Section 58.6 also provides that the circuit judge member of the medical
review panel "shall preside over all proceedings of the panel and shall
determine all procedural issues, including matters of evidence." But as to
other issues, both legal and factual, the power and function of the lawyer
and physician member of the panel are the same as that of the judge.
Furthermore, the powers of the judge concerning the determination of
"matters of evidence" are diluted by the provision that "The law of
evidence shall be followed, except as the panel in its discretion may
determine otherwise . . . " Section 58.7 provides that "The panel shall
make its determination according to the applicable substantive law," and
by its terms, the lawyer and physician are vested with authority, equal to
that of the judge, to determine and apply the "substantive law" ...
[even] over the dissent of the circuit judge. This, we hold, empowers the
nonjudicial members of the medical review panel to exercise a judicial
function in violation of . . .the Constitution.
7
'
In contrast to the statute involved in Wright, lay panel members under
Public Act 84-7 have no power to rule on the applicable substantive law.',
The judge member alone "determine[s] all questions of law, including matters
of evidence," '76 and the panel "make[s] its determination according to the
applicable substantive law as determined by the judge on the panel.." 7 Thus,
the encroachment on the judicial function that was present in Wright is
absent in Public Act 84-7.
Without the ability to render and enforce final judgments, review panels
are not correctly characterized as a "trial substitute. ' 78 The General Assembly
would exceed its constitutional authority if it attempted to create a new
"court" of first impression and empower panel members - the judge,
physician and attorney - to operate as a court. 79 Rather, the review panel
72. 63 III. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). Accord State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem.
Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 115 (Mo. 1979) (Simeone, J., concurring) (review panel
statute unconstitutional).
73. P.A. 79-960, § 58.8, 1975 Ill. Laws 2888.
74. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 III. 2d 313, 322, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-40
(1976).
75. Panel procedure and decision-making authority are governed by P.A. 84-7, §§ 2-1016 -
2-1017, 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 15-16 (West).
76. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1016(a), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 15 (West).
77. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1017(a), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 16 (West).
78. See Comment, Screening Panels, supra note 57, at 176-77.
79. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 317 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Grace
v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
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process contained in Public Act 84-7 more closely resembles a mandatory
pre-trial settlement conference, an analogy that recognizes the judge's duties
as judicial.8 0 The focus is therefore on the permissibility of judicial partici-
pation in pre-trial settlement conferences and on the availability of a trial
following the review panel proceeding as a sufficient guarantee of the
litigant's constitutional right of access to court.'
This view was articulated in Carter v. Sparkman,"2 in which the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida's medical review panel
statute. The concurring opinion characterized review panels as being distinct
from the "judicial forum" of the traditional common law trial, and, finding
no constitutional guarantee of immediate access to a formal trial,83 concluded
that "[tlhe panel becomes, in essence, akin to a required pre-trial settlement
conference, a procedure common in many jurisdictions at the onset of
litigation.'' 4
Because Illinois review panels cannot enter and enforce final judgments,
they should, like their Florida counterparts, be viewed as little more than a
required pre-trial settlement conference. Given the limited role played by the
lay panel members,85 it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the Illinois
review panel process could be considered an encroachment on the judicial
function in contravention of the Illinois Constitution.
B. Trial De Novo
In the so-called "Blue Ballot" of 1962, the state electorate amended the
Judicial Article of the Illinois Constitution to eliminate the numerous trial
courts of limited jurisdiction, replacing them with a single court of original
jurisdiction.8 6 That concept was retained in Article VI, section 9 of the 1970
Constitution with the following phrase: "Circuit courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters .. ".. ,,7 One purpose behind this
consolidation of trial courts was the elimination of the trial de novo, "the
appeal from justice of the peace or police magistrate courts, wherein jury
trials were available, to the county or circuit courts, wherein a second jury
trial was available in the trial de novo.' ' I Regarding these justice of the
peace and police magistrate courts, Professor Cohn has stated:
80. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976) (England, J. concurring).




85. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
86. See Giese, Why Illinois Proposes to Abolish Justice of the Peace Courts, 46 ILL. B.J.
754-61 (1958); Cedarquist, The Proposed Judicial Amendment, 39 Cm. B. REc. 109-13 (1958).
87. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (1970). For the full text of that section, see supra note 54.




[Tlheir principal deficiency, aside from the generally low level of compe-
tence of their judges, most of whom were not lawyers, was the fact that
they were not courts of record. Their decisions were re-triable de novo
either in the county or circuit court at the instance of the losing party
who frequently failed, quite deliberately, to defend in the justice or
magistrate courts . . . . The system of re-trials de novo from judgments
of justice and magistrate courts was expensive, frustrating, and wasteful
of judicial time and manpower. 9
Unlike those now-banned trial courts of limited jurisdiction, review panels
cannot issue binding and enforceable judgments absent agreement of the
parties and action by the courts.90 This contrasts sharply with the mandatory
arbitration statute reviewed in Grace v. Howlett,9 where the Illinois Supreme
Court wrote:
Under the provisions of Section 609 the award of the arbitrator "must be
entered by the Court in its record of judgments, and has the effect of a
judgment upon the parties unless reversed upon appeal." Such a procedure
cannot accurately be likened to pretrial procedures. By the terms of the
statute it is a judgment which is being reviewed. It is being reviewed by
the wasteful process of a trial de novo, the process which was intended
to be eliminated. 2
The review panel process, on the other hand, can accurately be likened to
pretrial procedures. 93 Because the panel procedure is not a trial and results
in no judgment, a subsequent proceeding in the circuit court is not a trial
de novo.
C. Fee Officers
Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution decrees that "[tihere
shall be no fee officers in the judicial system." 4 The Illinois Supreme Court
has defined "fees" as "court charges imposed on a litigant . . . [that are]
assessed to defray the costs of his litigation." 9 The problem inherent in a
89. G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 330-31 (1969). See also ILL. CONST. ANN. art. VI, § 9, Constitutional Commentary
(1970 Smith-Hurd) ("Section 9 retains the concept of a single integrated trial court structure in
Illinois. A single trial court prevents the conflicts which otherwise arise when there are numerous
trial courts of limited jurisdiction").
90. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
91. 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
92. Id., 283 N.E.2d at 480-81.
93. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
94. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1970).
95. Crocker v. Findley, 99 Ill. 2d 444, 452, 459 N.E.2d 1346, 1349-50 (1984) (emphasis
added). See also Giese, supra note 86, at 759 (describing fee system as one under which "the
justice was compensated by retaining the fees and costs (as distinguished from fines, penalties
and forfeitures) assessed by him against those who appear in cases before him . . ."). In Grace
v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 490, 283 N.E.2d 474, 481 (1972), the Illinois Supreme Court found
that a mandatory arbitration statute established fee officers where the statute required "the losing
litigant [to] pay the fees of the arbitrator, which fees are treated as costs."
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fee system is that it gives the adjudicator a financial interest in the outcome
of the dispute. 96 As Professor Sutherland explained:
The inherent evil of the fee system is that since the justice is dependent
for his compensation upon the fees and costs which he may collect from
litigants, he is interested in getting more business in order to enlarge his
income, and, therefore, he is disposed first, to encourage litigation of
controversies which otherwise might not get into the courts, and secondly,
to favor, sometimes improperly, those who bring him business.,'
Unlike the old justices of the peace, panel members receive a salary paid
not out of funds collected from litigants but out of the funds appropriated
to the Adminstrative Office of the Courts. 9 Such salaried personnel are not
prohibited by Article VI, section 14.99 Hence members of medical review
panels are not fee officers.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Courts have rarely conducted due process reviews of statutes that regulate
a plaintiff's access to court.10 Rather, courts typically invoke the due process
clause to protect criminal defendants, who must appear in court to protect
themselves against a finding of guilt. 1° 1 In the civil context, due process
guarantees usually are satisfied when persons who are adversely affected by
a statute are given notice and an opportunity to be heard in opposition."'2
Thus, under a traditional due process analysis, states may enact statutes that
96. In the criminal context, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-32 (1927) (conviction by
magistrate who had direct financial interest in outcome of trial, because of fee he would receive
only in event of conviction, lacked due process).
97. Sutherland, A Study of the Justice of the Peace and Other Minor Courts, 21 CONN. B.J.
300, 331-34 (1947), quoted in Giese, supra note 86, at 759-60 (1958). See also Luvera, Justice
for a Fee, 53 A.B.A. J. 242 (1967).
98. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1019(a), (b), 1985 III. Legis. Serv. 17 (West).
99. Then Chief Justice Underwood implied as much in his dissent in Grace v. Howlett, 51
III. 2d 478, 513, 283 N.E.2d 474, 492 (1972), writing: "If it should subsequently develop that
sufficient numbers of arbitrators are unwilling to serve without compensation, the General As-
sembly may well provide some method of payment other than 'fees'." See also ILL. CONST. ANN.
art. VI, § 14, Constitutional Commentary at 518 (1970 Smith-Hurd) ("If the State wishes to
provide a salaried judicial officer to perform the functions of the old Master in Chancery, on
a non-fee basis to litigants, it is permitted to do so").
100. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971) (recognizing general inapplic-
ability of due process clause to statutes that regulate plaintiff's access to court).
101. Id. For criminal defendants, a judicial hearing is a matter of substantive importance.
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354-358 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
16-20 (1956). Additionally, criminal statutes must give notice of the conduct they prohibit. People
v. McPherson, 65 Ill. App. 3d 772, 382 N.E.2d 858 (1978).
102. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971); Hardware Dealers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Gratten v. Ahlberg Bearing Co., 373
Ill. 455, 26 N.E.2d 499 (1940); Estate of Oliver v. Wildermuth, 50 III. App. 3d I, 365 N.E.2d
281 (1977). Also, due process requires that the hearing not be biased or otherwise unfair. See
infra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
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require medical malpractice claimants to proceed before a medical review
panel prior to gaining access to the state courts. 03
Indeed, the federal courts have considered access to state courts primarily
an issue of state concern and have accorded state legislatures great latitude
to establish and alter the governing procedures for access to their courts."'
Furthermore, a medical malpractice plaintiff has no property interest in pre-
existing procedures for enforcing his common law right to a remedy.'",
Hence, no "taking" issue arises under the federal or state due process clause.
An apparent exception to this traditional approach has arisen in cases that
involve a fundamental right of an indigent plaintiff for whom even nominal
filing costs bar access to the courts and for whom no means of satisfaction
as an alternative to the courts is available."' 6 In Boddie v. Connecticut,"
v7
103. Accord Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 387, 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (1980)
(Indiana medical malpractice panel procedure does not violate due process).
104. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 551-52 (1949). In upholding a
state requirement that a large bond be posted as a condition precedent to bringing a shareholder's
derivative suit, the Court stated, "A state may set the terms on which it will permit litigation
in its courts." Id. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (restriction on defenses in
actions by landlords against tenants not violative of due process because tenants empowered to
bring their own actions); Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924) (statute requiring state
testing of fertilizer before action could be brought in state court for crop damage from use of
fertilizer held not violative of due process); West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 303, 313
(3d Cir. 1975) ("Nor is a party deprived of due process merely because it must seek administrative
resolution of claims before it has access to the courts") (citing Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946)).
105. The United States Supreme Court has written:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of common law. That is
only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other.
Rights of property which have been created by common law cannot be taken away
without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the
will or even the whim of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limita-
tions. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law
as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1877) (quoted in Hurtado v. State of California, 110 U.S.
516, 531 (1884)). From that quote, the Indiana Court concluded:
The relationship of health care provider and patient imposes on the health care
provider a common law legal duty. The nature and extent of that duty may be
modified by legislation. Hence, the Legislature may also validly act to restrict the
remedy available for breach of that duty. This challenged provision of the Act may
not be regarded as repugnant to due process simply because it alters the standing
manner of achieving a remedy in court, or because it restricts a long time remedy.
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 387, 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (1980) (upholding Indiana
malpractice panel provision).
106. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,
434-46 (1973); Boddie v. United States, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also NAACP v. Patty, 159 F.
Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167 (1959) (statute making it crime to employ attorney for proceedings in which employer-client
is not party and has no interest ruled unconstitutional as violation of due process).
107. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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the United States Supreme Court ruled that requiring fees to be paid before
a divorce suit could be filed violated the due process rights of those persons
who could not afford to pay the fees. The importance to society of the
substantive issue - the dissolution of marriage - and the state's involvement
in regulating that fundamental relationship prompted the Court to accord
due process protections to the plaintiff.' °0 The Court in Boddie reasoned
that, since a person must go to court to lawfully dissolve a marriage, his
situation was analogous to that of a defendant who is required to go to
court to defend his rights. Therefore, a plaintiff in a divorce action is entitled
to a hearing under the due process clause." Beyond an indigent's right of
access to divorce proceedings, Boddie specifically refrained from declaring
any significant limitations upon a state's ability to regulate access to its
courts: "The legitimacy of the State's monopoly over techniques of final
dispute settlement, even where some are denied access to its use, stands
unimpaired where recognized, effective alternatives for the adjustment of
differences remain.''110
The medical malpractice plaintiff in Illinois is clearly distinguishable from
the divorce plaintiff in Boddie. Medical review panels do not bar access to
a forum for adjudicating the malpractice claim. In fact, the panels are
themselves such a forum. Also, the parties to a medical malpractice action
may proceed to court if dissatisfied with the panel determination."' Finally,
a person's right to bring a tort suit has never been held to rise to the level
of constitutional significance as does the right to contract or to dissolve a
marriage." 2 Thus, no real due process issue arises where such review panels
burden," 3 but do not deny, a medical malpractice plaintiff's access to the
courts.'"'
Given the ultimate access to the courts afforded a medical malpractice
plaintiff, it is perhaps unnecessary to examine whether the presence of a
108. Id. at 376.
109. Id. at 375-76.
110. Id. Later cases have limited the application of Boddie. See United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973) (Boddie rationale held inapplicable to filing fee for bankruptcy because bank-
ruptcy does not rise to same level of constitutional importance as does divorce); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (appellate court's filing fee did not deprive indigent of due process
when it prevented him from appealing results of an agency hearing on welfare payments because
due process clause guarantees only hearing and not appeal therefrom).
I 1. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
112. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
113. Medical review panels burden access to the courts by delaying admittance and by im-
posing additional costs to achieve that admittance. See supra note 31.
114. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1973) (restriction on defenses in suit
by landlord against tenant not violative of due process); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949) (security bond requirement as prerequisite to suit not violative of due
process); Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 181 (1924) (statute requiring state testing




physician on the panel renders that forum biased in violation of due process
guarantees."' Nevertheless, at least five courts have considered and rejected
the argument." 6 The cases uniformly conclude that it is totally speculative
to assert that all health care providers are incapable of rendering an unbiased
opinion in a medical malpractice suit."17 Furthermore, Public Act 84-7 gives
both parties the opportunity to dismiss any prospective panel member who
has a conflict of interest in connection with the case." ' Finally, it may be
desirable to have a health care professional on the panel in order to ensure
that the panel has the expertise to screen the claims for merit and to make
determinations that encourage prompt settlements." 9
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Review Panels Generally
The review panel process established in Public Act 84-7 discriminates
against medical malpractice plaintiffs by imposing upon them an additional
burden not placed on other personal injury claimants who have direct access
to the courts. However, not all forms of discrimination violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment'2 0 or of its functionally
equivalent 2' counterpart in the Illinois Constitution. 22 Only unreasonable
and invidious classification schemes violate these equal protection guaran-
115. Due process requires that the hearing not be biased or otherwise unfair. See People v.
Scott, 326 III. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927); People v. Ruffalo, 69 III. App. 3d 532, 388 N.E.2d
114 (1979).
116. Hines v. Elkhart General Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 384-85, 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (1980); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d
1187, 1192 (Mont. 1981); Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 128-29, 394
A.2d 932, 943-44 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 515, 261 N.W.2d
434, 446 (1978).
117. Id.
118. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1015(b), 1985 111. Legis. Serv. 14 (West). Additionally, P.A. 84-7, § 2-
1015(0, 1985 I1. Legis. Serv. 14 (West), provides:
No attorney or health professional may participate as a member of a panel if he is
materially associated with any attorney, health professional, or party in the case.
No attorney or health professional may participate as a member of a panel if he
has a conflict of interest, as determined by the court on a motion filed by any party
or by the attorney, or health professional.
119. Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Mont. 1982); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie,
81 Wis. 2d 491, 515, 261 N.W.2d 434, 446 (1978).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. In People v. Kaeding, 98 III. 2d 237, 245, 456 N.E.2d 11, 16 (1983), the Illinois Supreme
Court stated, "When examining a legislative scheme which creates classifications by providing
for different treatment of groups of persons, this court adheres to the framework of analysis
used by the [United States) Supreme Court." See also Illinois Polygraph Soc'y v. Pellicano, 82
Ill. 2d 130, 414 N.E.2d 458 (1980); People ex rel. Tucker v. Kostos, 68 III. 2d 88, 368 N.E.2d
903 (1977).
122. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 2 (1970).
1985]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
tees.' 23 Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the special legislative treatment
accorded to medical malpractice claims under Public Act 84-7 constitutes an
unreasonable or invidious classification.
Any equal protection examination must begin with a determination of
what standard of review should be used. Under the traditional two-tiered
analysis, courts evaluate legislative classifications under the relatively relaxed
"rational basis" standard, which Professor Linde contends "is not judicial
review but dismissal of a claim of review,"'' 24 or the more exacting "strict
scrutiny" standard, which Professor Gunther asserts "has been 'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact."' 2 Courts will utilize the strict scrutiny test only
when the statute under review contains a "suspect classification" or limits
a "fundamental right."'1
26
Classifications are considered "suspect" when the "class is . . .saddled
with such disabilities or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness, as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political proc-
ess."' 27 To date, the Supreme Court has recognized as suspect only those
legislative classifications involving race, 2" national origin 29 and alienage. 30
Surely health care tort victims cannot be considered such a suspect class.
Courts also employ a strict scrutiny analysis when a "fundamental right"
is affected, even if the classification is not directed at a downtrodden
minority. 3 ' The Supreme Court has limited this category to only those rights
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,"'3 2 thus far recog-
nizing as fundamental only the rights of privacy, marriage, voting, travel
and associational freedom.' 33 No appellate court has ever found a funda-
123. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ("invidious discrimination");
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ("unreasonable classification").
124. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 210 (1976).
125. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972). To survive a strict scrutiny analysis, a statute
must be "'tailored narrowly to serve legitimate objectives' . . . in furtherance of compelling
governmental interests." People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 245, 456 N.E.2d 11, 16 (1983).
126. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1971); People v. Kaeding, 98
Ill. 2d 237, 245-46, 456 N.E.2d 11, 16-17 (1983).
127. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 28 (1973).
128. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964).
129. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
130. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare statute that discriminated
against aliens violative of equal protection guarantees).
131. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(privacy); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association).
132. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I. 33-34 (1973).
133. See supra note 131.
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mental right to exist in collecting damages for personal injuries" ' or in
obtaining direct access to the courts for the resolution of claims. 3 In keeping
with the strong reluctance of the Illinois and federal courts to recognize
additional rights as fundamental, 3 6 it is highly unlikely that Public Act
84-7 will be found to impinge upon a fundamental right.
Because the review panel statute involves neither a suspect class nor a
fundamental right, a traditional equal protection analysis would assess the
act under the rational basis test. The Supreme Court described that test in
its oft-cited decision McGowan v. Maryland."7
The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection] is offended only if the
classification rests on some ground wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the state's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within
their constitutional powers despite the fact that, in practice, their law
results in some inequality. A statutory determination will not be set aside
if any statement of facts may be reasonably conceived to justify it.'
134. Cf. Rohrbaugh v. Wagnorer, 274 Ind. 661, 664-65, 413 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1980) (medical
malpractice claim); Comisky v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 313, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (1976) (med-
ical malpractice claim).
135. Cf. Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007, 1011-12 (4th Cir. 1970) (federal employee's
common-law right of action against co-worker for injuries sustained in automobile accident not
fundamental right). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court found that access
to the courts was "the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human re-
lationship [i.e., marriage]," and concluded that a state may not "preempt the right to dissolve
this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for
doing so." Id. at 383. In contrast, the Court has held that access to the courts for the resolution
of claims that involve rights not subject to special constitutional protection may be denied if
supported by a rational basis; that is, no proof is required of any compelling state interest or
that the means chosen was the least restrictive. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973)
($25 filing fee which operated to deprive appellants of opportunity to obtain appellate review
of agency determination reducing welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
(filing fee as precondition to petition court for discharge in bankruptcy). These decisions led a
New York court to conclude that "the Supreme Court has made it clear that access to the courts
in and of itself is not an independent constitutional right." Comisky v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304,
313, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (1976). See also Seoane v. Ortho Pharma., Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 150
(5th Cir. 1980) (upholding Louisiana medical malpractice panel statute against equal protection
challenge: "[a]s a constitutional matter, when a right is not fundamental, access to the courts
may be restricted").
136. See People v. Kaeding, 98 III. 2d 237, 246, 456 N.E.2d I1, 16-17 (1983), in which the
court wrote:
"Fundamental interests generally are those that lie at the heart of the relationship
between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government"
... and are rooted in explicit or implicit constitutional guarantees .... This court,
in keeping with the view of the Supreme Court, has previously recognized a re-
sponsibility not to engage in the creation of substantive constitutional rights ...
"in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."
(Citations omitted.)
137. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
138. Id. at 425-26. Accord Pazner v. Mauck, 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255, 383 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1978)
("The court's only inquiry is whether the legislation represents a rational means to accomplish
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This standard is appropriate for reviewing legislation in the "area of eco-
nomics and social welfare" in general,' 3 9 and in the area of medical mal-
practice in particular.- 4
The classification scheme embodied in the review panel procedure of Public
Act 84-7 would be upheld as constitutional under a rational basis test for
the following three reasons. First, the act serves the valid 4 ' legislative goal
of encouraging prompt dismissals of frivolous suits and prompt settlements
of meritorious claims' 2 so as to alleviate any threat to the delivery of health
care services caused by the unavailability of reasonably priced medical mal-
practice insurance. 43 Second, the need for the act is supported by the vast
literature describing a crisis in the medical malpractice insurance market,' 44
and courts are extremely reluctant to set aside a legislative classification "if
any set of facts may be conceived to justify it."14 Third, as explained below,
a showing can be made that a relationship exists between the class of people
designated by the review panel statute and the public harm to be remedied
thereby.146 Increasing medical malpractice insurance rates are in part caused
a proper purpose .... We will not substitute our judgment for that of the legislature"); Doolin
v. Korshak, 39 Ill. 2d 521, 527, 236 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1968) ("A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any set of facts may be conceived to justify it") (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)).
139. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970):
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.
If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality .... The problems of government are prac-
tical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations - illogical,
it may be, and unscientific.
Numerous cases reviewing legislation in the area of economics and social welfare have utilized
the rational basis standard. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1960).
140. Numerous courts reviewing similar panel statutes have employed the rational basis stand-
ard. See, e.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharma., Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1980); DiAntonio
v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial, 628 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1980); Woods v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172-75 (5th Cir. 1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583, 570
P.2d 744, 750-51 (1977); Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1177 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Paro v.
Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977).
141. See supra note 45. Cf. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976)
(questioning nature and scope of alleged medical malpractice crisis in Idaho) (remanded for
additional evidence), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
142. See supra note 9.
143. See supra notes 3-17 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes I, 2 & 17. But see Bernier v. Burnis, 85 CH 6625, Trial Court Findings
A-I to A-6 (filed June 25, 1985), reprinted in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1985, at 2.
145. Doolin v. Korshak, 39 Il1. 2d 521, 528, 236 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1968) (quoting McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-46 (1961)).
146. Such a showing is required. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949).
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by the marked increase in malpractice claims and awards, 41 which could be
checked if more malpractice suits were settled or disposed of before trial.' s4
Because the review panel process arguably facilitates such early disposition
of claims, 49 the classification of malpractice actions is sufficiently related to
the legislative purpose embodied in Public Act 84-7.1s°
This traditional two-tiered analysis, with its predictable result,' 5 ' has been
abandoned in a limited number of recent cases,'52 causing Professor Gunther
to discern a movement toward application of what he has labeled a "means-
oriented scrutiny test.""' Under this standard a court does not question the
legitimacy of the legislative rationale for the challenged classification. 14
Instead, a court examines whether the classification "rest[s] upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation.""'  This standard, while providing the legislature with more
flexibility than the strict scrutiny test, requires the state to provide a greater
justification for its classification than is necessary under the rational basis
test. Legislation is held unconstitutional under the rational basis standard
only "if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant" to the achieve-
ment of a conceivably legitimate purpose."16 Under the means scrutiny test,
however, a "substantial relationship" must be established between the means
and the ends of the challenged legislation." 7
An examination of the Court's use of the means scrutiny test reveals that
it has been limited to "twilight zone" cases"" - those in which a quasi-
fundamental right" 9 or an "almost" suspect class is present.160 While the
147. See supra notes 1, 2 & 17 and accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 9.
150. See supra note 139.
151. See Linde, supra note 124, at 202-03:
[T]he famous two-tier model of equal protection analysis ... deserves a better press
than it has had in its later years .... The strength of this simple model is not just
that its premises are manageable in practice, though that is no small advantage. Its
strength is that it calls for judicial scrutiny of a law only by reference to values
located somewhere in the Constitution, values external to the complex of ends and
means and mere inertia that has resulted in the existing state of the law.
152. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
153. Gunther, supra note 125, at 20-24. The "means scrutiny" analysis was derived in part
from Redish, supra note 2, at 771-82.
154. Gunther, supra note 125, at 21.
155. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
156. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (emphasis added).
157. Gunther, supra note 125, at 20 (emphasis added).
158. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Anal-
ysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. REV. 343, 354 n.57 (1974).
159. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (food
stamps); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal
defendants); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives).
160. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (classifications premised on legiti-
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review panel statute does not involve an "almost" suspect class, it arguably
does involve discrimination affecting the enjoyment of a quasi-fundamental
right "since the right of compensation for injury is arguably of great
significance." '6' Without articulating the basis for their decision to do so,
several courts have analyzed medical malpractice legislation using the means
scrutiny standard,' 62 as have dissenting opinions in another such case.' 63 With
one exception," these cases all involved legislative attempts to cap the
amount of damages that may be awarded to a medical malpractice plaintiff.
65
The exception involved a panel provision similar to that of Illinois, with the
court upholding the statute under the means scrutiny test.'1 As explained
macy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender based classification); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (gender based classification).
161. Redish, supra note 2, at 774. In analyzing the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, one
commentator reached a similar conclusion, writing:
The great significance of the right to recover for bodily injury justifies application
of the intermediate, "means scrutiny" standard. Full compensation for tort injuries
is a state-created right. Since, as a state-created right, the right to collect for bodily
injury is not considered a "fundamental" right the "strict scrutiny" standard cannot
be applied. However, as a state-created right, the right to collect for bodily injury
warrants application of a stricter standard than "rational basis."
Note, Constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Re-Evaluated, 19 VAL. U.L.
REV. 493, 508 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutionality Re-Evaluated].
162. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 867, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 392, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (1980); Atneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980);
Graley v. Stayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 320, 343 N.E.2d 832, 837 (C.C. 1976). The use of
the means scrutiny test may have a significant impact on the results of the constitutional review.
As one commentator explained:
[T]hose courts striking down medical malpractice legislation on equal protection
grounds have all utilized a more exacting standard of review than mere rationality.
Although these courts have explicitly concentrated on the factual nexus between
purpose and means, an implicit evaluation of conflicting interests also appears to
play a prominent role in the judicial decision-making process. The courts have bal-
anced the state goals, assuring adequate health care and lowering malpractice in-
surance costs, with the interests of the victims of medical malpractice. In each instance,
the constituti onal balance has favored those victims.
Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 880 (1979).
163. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 338 Cal. 3d 137, 178-79, 695 P.2d 665, 694-95, 211
Cal. Rptr. 368, 397-98 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting); id. at 172-73, 695 P.2d at 691-92, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
164. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980). The court in Johnson
did not expressly state that it was utilizing the means scrutiny test in analyzing the Indiana review
panel statute. It did, however, adopt the test enunciated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
considered a leading means scrutiny case. Id. at 392, 404 N.E.2d at 597.
165. See supra notes 162-63.
166. See supra note 164.
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below, the Illinois Supreme Court should reach the same result in the unlikely
event 67 it adopts the means scrutiny standard as the appropriate test for
assessing the review panel procedure.
It seems highly unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Court would question
the existence of a crisis in the medical malpractice insurance market given
the enormous volume of written documentation of the problem.' 6 Rather,
the court would merely inquire whether the review panels will substantially
alleviate that crisis. Should the panel procedure succeed in facilitating the
early dismissal or settlement of malpractice claims, they surely will reduce
litigation costs and produce greater actuarial certainty in the prediction of
future medical malpractice awards. 69 Review panels, unlike traditional pre-
trial settlement conferences, should provide an impetus for the early disposal
of claims because they make issue determinations that are based on a
systematic review of the evidence, including expert testimony, and therefore
give the litigants a fair indication of the probable outcome at trial. 70 Thus,
the classification scheme contained in Public Act 84-7 "rest[s] upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation." 171
The foregoing analysis would be avoided if the Illinois Supreme Court
declined to use a means scrutiny test in its equal protection analysis of Public
Act 84-7. Such a decision would place Illinois in conformity with the vast
majority of states that have considered the question. 72 In fact, there is some
doubt as to the continued viability of the means scrutiny standard.' For
example, during the same term in which it purportedly adopted the means
scrutiny standard, the United States Supreme Court used the rational basis
test in a case challenging a classification that allegedly infringed on the right
of privacy to choose one's lifestyle. 74 Whether an individual's interest in
compensation for bodily injury is more fundamental than his privacy interest
in choosing a lifestyle is at best debatable.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the use of a means scrutiny test
and in favor of the more relaxed rational basis standard is the avoidance of
167. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 1, 2 and 17 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 2.
170. Accord Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels - A Constitutional
Examination, 44 IrNs. CouNs. J. 416, 425 (1977).
171. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
172. See supra note 140. In Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 649 n.6, 369 N.E.2d
985, 988 n.6 (1977), the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the rational basis test without
considering the means scrutiny test because the facts did not present a need to consider a test
stricter than the rational basis test.
173. See Redish, supra note 2, at 773-74.
174. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974) (upholding ordinance restricting use
of land to one-family dwelling while defining "family" to include not more than two unrelated
persons).
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the dangers inherent in a generally unrepresentative judiciary vetoing complex
social policy judgments formulated by the representative units of govern-
ment.'" As one commentator wrote:
It is ... almost impossible to predict whether reform legislation will
accomplish its goal. This uncertainty underscores the inadvisability of
employing means scrutiny analysis to test medical malpractice legislation.
The use of means scrutiny in this situation creates all the obstacles to
legislative action that the Supreme Court's rejection of strict scrutiny in
all but a handful of cases is designed to avoid: social legislation developed
by representative legislative bodies is seriously frustrated by judicial spec-
ulation?1
B. The Cost-Shifting Provision
Section 2-1019(c), the "cost-shifting" provision of the medical review
panel statute, deserves particularly close equal protection analysis. This
section states:
Where a party who has rejected a unanimous determination of the review
panel does not prevail on the issue of liability on the trial of the case and
has not been granted a post trial motion to upset the result of trial, the
trial court on the motion of any prevailing party shall summarily tax to
the rejecting party the costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses of
the prevailing party incurred in connection with the review panel and the
trial. Such motion may not be made or granted if both the prevailing
party and non-prevailing party have rejected the determination of the
medical review panel.'"
The apparent intent of this provision is to encourage medical malpractice
litigants to abide by unanimous review panel determinations. Such an intent
is consistent with the goal of the review panel process generally: the en-
couragement of early settlements for obviously meritorious claims and rapid
dismissals for patently non-meritorious ones.'"
The incentives embodied in Section 2-1019(c) spring from differences in
treatment afforded to two groups of medical malpractice litigants: those who
reject unanimous panel determination and those who do not. Litigants fall
into the latter category either because they accept a unanimous determination
or because the determination was not unanimous. Such a classification
scheme does not rest on grounds "wholly irrelevant" to the achievement of
a conceivably legitimate purpose, 79 and thus passes the rational basis test.
This result is made clear by considering all malpractice claims on a spectrum
from least to most meritorious. Under the minimal scrutiny of the rational
175. Redish, supra note 2, at 776.
176. Id. at 782.
177. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1019(c), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 17 (West).
178. See supra note 9.
179. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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basis test, it seems likely that a court would conclude that some relationship
might exist between the claims at both extremes of the spectrum, i.e., claims
for which the panel process encourages an early disposal, and claims which
receive unanimous panel determinations. The correspondence need not be
perfect, as the Supreme Court explained in Dandridge v. Williams."0
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality .... ." The problems of government are practical ones and may
justify, if they do not require, rough accomodations - illogical; it may
be, and unscientific .... 181
A different result would likely follow were a means scrutiny test em-
ployed. 18 2 Making the cost-shifting provision applicable only to those claims
that are subject to unanimous panel determinations simply does not bear a
"fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."' 3 This is due
to the impossibility of determining where a claim would fall on the frivolous-
meritorious spectrum solely by considering the unanimous or non-unanimous
character of a panel decision. Additionally, it is difficult to differentiate
qualitatively between a unanimous panel determination on damages and a
non-unanimous determination where the sole dissenter would award slightly
less or slightly more in damages. Yet, the difference between these two
determinations is highly significant for the litigant who would opt to proceed
to trial.
Two hypothetical examples should illustrate the point. In the first situation,
plaintiff "A" obtains a unanimous panel determination in which the defend-
ant is liable in the amount of $100,000. A is convinced that the panel severely
understated his damages. He may proceed to trial only at the risk of being
assessed substantial costs and fees.'8 Plaintiff "B," on the other hand,
receives a 2-1 determination of no liability, with the dissenting panel member
finding only nominal damages. B may proceed to trial with impunity. In the
second situation, both malpractice claimants suffer identical injuries at the
hands of the same physician. Plaintiff "C" obtains a unanimous determi-
nation of liability and damages in the amount of $250,000. Plaintiff "D"
receives a 2-1 determination with the dissenting panel member agreeing as
to liability but disagreeing as to damages. Only D may proceed to trial
without fear of being assessed costs and fees.
180. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
181. Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) and
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913)).
182. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
183. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
184. See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
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A similar analysis resulted in the invalidation of an Illinois statute that
required arbitration of small personal injury claims arising out of automobile
accidents.' 85 The classification was found to be defectively underinclusive
because it excluded, without substantial justification, operators of other
motor vehicles.8 6 Similarly, the California Supreme Court struck down that
state's guest statute' 7 utilizing the means scrutiny test enunciated in Reed v.
Reed. 88 The statute was held unconstitutional on three grounds: 1) that it
improperly distinguished between automobile guests and other kinds of social
invitees who were not barred from suing their hosts, 2) that it irrationally
discriminated between paying and nonpaying automobile guests, and 3) that
it irrationally distinguished automobile guests from other persons injured in
automobile accidents. 8 9
If found to be unconstitutional under a means scrutiny test, Section 2-
1019(c) might be cured by amendment to allow assessment of fees and costs
only on those parties who the trial judge determines acted vexatiously or in
bad faith by proceeding to trial. Such discretionary taxing of fees and costs
is consistent with a number of statutes.190 The classifications established by
such a provision, i.e., those who have been judicially determined to have
proceeded to trial in bad faith and those who have not, would certainly bear
a close relationship to the statutory goals of the panel review process.
C. Diversity Jurisdiction
A final question under equal protection is whether the Illinois review panel
process will apply to litigants who bring medical malpractice actions in
185. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
186. Id. at 487-77, 283 N.E.2d at 478-79.
187. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
188. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
189. The court found that the statute was designed to serve two purposes: first, "to promote
hospitality by insulating generous drivers from lawsuits instituted by ungrateful guests who have
benefited from a free ride"; and second, "to eliminate the possibility of collusive lawsuits." In
rejecting these grounds, the court stated: "[Neither of these justifications) provides a reasonable
explanation for the tripartite discrimination established by the statute and thus neither provides
a rational basis to uphold the section .... Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 864, 506 P.2d
212, 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 394 (1973).
190. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) (1983) ("costs may be
assessed against the plaintiff only where the court finds that the suit was initiated by the plaintiff
primarily for frivolous or dilatory purposes"); Jury System Improvements Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1875(d)(2) (1983) ("[tlhe court may award a prevailing employer a reasonable attorneys' fee
as part of the costs only if the court finds that the action is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in
bad faith"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, § 2-611 (1983) ("[alllegations and denials, made without
reasonable cause and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the payment
of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee .... ); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 219(a) (1983)
(authorizes assessment of reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, for refusal
to answer deposition questions if such refusal was "without substantial justification"). Inter-
estingly, the statute struck down in Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 i11. 2d 313, 320-




federal court under diversity jurisdiction. If the Illinois procedure does not
apply in federal court, the review panel provisions arguably make an irra-
tional distinction between medical malpractice plaintiffs who are Illinois
residents and those who are not. 9 '
Several commentators have argued that state statutes requiring submission
of malpractice claims to pre-trial screening panels have no place in federal
court. 92 In Wheeler v. Shoemaker,'93 which involved a Rhode Island statute,
a federal district court reached the same conclusion. The statute,' 94 like that
of Illinois,' 95 requires judicial referral of all medical malpractice cases to a
pre-trial screening panel immediately after the suit has been filed with the
state court. The district court concluded that the Rhode Island screening
panel functioned as "adjunct of the superior court" and, as such, would
impermissibly deprive the federal court of "the congressional grant of di-
versity jurisdiction."' 96 Accepting this rationale, the Illinois panels are as
much or more a part of the state trial courts. 197 However, all the other
federal courts that have addressed the issue reject Wheeler and require
litigants to comply with the applicable screening panel statute before their
medical malpractice claims may be heard in federal court. 98
191. The argument may be stated as follows: nonresident plaintiffs may avoid the review panel
procedure altogether by opting to bring suit in federal court, while a resident plaintiff, who
claims injury at the hands of the same Illinois-based health provider, must undergo the review
panel process. Such a distinction between Illinois residents and non-residents is not related to
the statutory goal of reducing medical malpractice insurance costs.
192. See Comment, The Confrontation Between State Compulsory Medical Malpractice
Screening Statutes and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1980 DUKE L.J. 546; Comment, Man-
datory State Malpractice Arbitration Boards and the Erie Problem: Edelson v. Soricelli, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1562 (1980). See also Turner, Medical Malpractice Arbitration on the Erie Rail-
road, II U. TOL. L. REV. I, 25-26 (1979), in which the author concluded that the relevant case
law
doles] not require or forbid the implementation of state malpractice arbitration pro-
cedures in the federal court, but [it does] require that the costs of implementation
be considered by the federal courts. If those arbitration costs are found to be ex-
cessive, the state's arbitration procedures should be ignored.
193. 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978). See also Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Rosen, J., dissenting) (Pennsylvania Health Care Act advances no legitimate state interest and
countervails many important federal considerations).
194. R.1. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-1 et seq.
195. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1013, 1985 III. Legis. Serv. II (West).
196. Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 221-23 (D.R.I. 1978). See McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268 (1910); Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871); Floeter
v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
197. The Rhode Island and Illinois statutes share the following features: the presiding judge
of the county court appoints the prospective panel members, plaintiffs must file their claims in
state court prior to panel review, and the litigants may proceed to trial should either party reject
the panel's determination. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-1 et seq. (1981); P.A. 84-7, § 2-1013 et
seq., 1985 I11. Legis. Serv. II (West). The Illinois statute further provides that the judge who
is a member of the panel shall make all determinations of law. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1013 et seq., 1985
111. Legis. Serv. 15 (West).
198. Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d
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In diversity actions, federal courts must apply those state statutes that
create or are bound up with rights and obligations as opposed to those that
merely control the form, mode, manner and means of enforcing such rights
and obligations.' 99 Medical review panels further substantive purposes by
discouraging prosecution of baseless claims, encouraging settlements, and
seeking generally to stabilize the health care system.2 °° Wheeler erred in
failing to consider these substantive purposes underlying the Rhode Island
panel statute.2 '
Mandatory pre-trial screening provisions do not divest a court, state or
federal, of jurisdiction.0 2 They merely burden the right of access for the
purpose of achieving the above-stated substantive goals. To the extent that
a federal court is deprived of jurisdiction by reference to a screening panel,
the ouster is only temporary. If either party rejects the panel decision, the
1164 (5th Cir. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Seoane v.
Ortho Pharm., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. La. 1979); Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore,
Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978); Wells v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo. 1977);
Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 435 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Flote-
mersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
199. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1983); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (federal court
should apply state rule "if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation"); Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Elec. Corp., 356 U.S. 515, 536 (1958) (federal court must determine whether state
requirement is "merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity [or] a rule intended to be
bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties"). See also, Szantay
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1965) (if state provision is substantive right
or obligation at issue, or is procedure intimately bound with state right or obligation, it is
controlling); Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976) (state
evidence rule so bound with state substantive law that federal courts sitting in state should accord
it same treatment as state courts).
200. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1174 (5th Cir. 1979) ("One significant
factor causing the rising insurance rates was an increase in malpractice litigation, and one way
to reduce such litigation was to screen out non-meritorious claims through the use of liability
mediation panels"). By encouraging abandonment of meritless claims and settlement of good
claims, pre-trial screening panels may serve the broader purpose of inhibiting medical malpractice
litigation, which in turn will help relieve the medical malpractice crisis. See Redish & Phillips,
Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV.
356, 399 n.228, 400 n.231 (1977).
201. Alexander, State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in Federal Diversity Actions, 21
ARIz. L. REV. 959, 997 (1979).
202. The United States Supreme Court has held applicable in diversity suits various "door
closing" state statutes; that is, acts which do not relate to the underlying merits of the plaintiff's
claim but merely prevent its enforcement for some extrinsic reason. See Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (statutory requirement that foreign corporations doing business
in Mississippi file with state name of designated agent upon whom process can be served, with
failure to comply resulting in forfeiture of right to bring or maintain action in state court);
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (security bond requirement as
precondition to litigation). See also Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Ju-
risdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1956).
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action will continue in federal court in normal fashion, 203 and thus, diversity
jurisdiction remains intact.
In accordance with public policy considerations and the great weight of
authority,2 4 the Illinios review panel procedure will likely be held applicable
in federal diversity actions. Hence, the potential equal protection problems
do not arise.
V. SPECIAL LEGISLATION
The prohibition against "special legislation" found in the Illinois
Constitution 205 is related to the requirements of the federal and state equal
protection clauses. Article IV, section 13 states: "The General Assembly
shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made
applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a
matter for judicial determination. ' ' 2° This restriction on local or special laws
can be violated in two ways: first, by making a statute apply to a person or
entity that is explicitly named in the statute when such specificity is unnec-
essary; or second, by making a statute apply to a described class of persons
or entities in a manner that is illogical and unfair.207 While the first special
legislation test does not apply to Public Act 84-7,20s the second test has
potential relevance. 2°9
The extent to which the second special legislation test differs from an
equal protection analysis has not always been clear. In Grace v. Howlett,2 °
the Illinois Supreme Court claimed that while the special legislation and
equal protection "provisions of the 1970 Constitution cover much of the
same terrain, they are not duplicates." '' Yet, during that same term the
203. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018, 1985 Il1. Legis. Serv. 16 (West).
204. See supra note 198.
205. For a similar special legislation analysis, see Redish, supra note 2, at 782-84.
206. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970). Other state constitutions contain similar prohibitions.
See generally Cloe & Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 351 (1936).
207. See generally Anderson v. Wagner, 79 111. 2d 295, 313-14, 402 N.E.2d 560, 568-69 (1979)
(if classification bears reasonable and proper relation to purpose of act and evil it seeks to
remedy, it does not violate constitutional proscription of special or local laws); G. BRADEN &
R. COHN, supra note 89, at 203-26 (1969); Illinois Legislative Council, 1970 Illinois Constitution
Annotated 36 (1983).
208. Public Act 84-7 does not expressly name specific persons or entities to which it applies.
This compares with statutes appropriating money for specific places, persons, or businesses.
Such statutes are allowed because a general law cannot be made applicable to such specific
situations. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
209. Judge Wosik ruled that the panel provisions of Public Act 84-7 violated the special
legislation clause of the Illinois constitution. Bernier v. Burris, 85 CH 6625, Trial Court Con-
clusion of Law No. A-2 (a) (filed June 25, 1985), reprinted in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec.
19, 1985, at 2.
210. 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
211. Id. at 487, 283 N.E.2d at 479. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 872,
555 P.2d 399, 417 (1976) (Idaho's special legislation provision and equal protection clause "were
adopted to serve distinctly different purposes").
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court formulated a special legislation test that sounds strikingly similar to
the rational basis standard it uses in equal protection analysis:
If there is a reasonable basis for the classification, and it bears a reasonable
and proper relation to the purposes of the act and the evil it seeks to
remedy, it does not violate the constitutional proscription of special or
local laws. . . . If there is a reasonable basis for differentiating between
the class to which the law is applicable and the class to which it is not,
the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons and objects
for the purpose of legislative regulation or control, and may pass laws
applicable only to such persons or objects. . . . Such classifications will
be sustained where founded upon a rational difference of situation or
condition existing in the objects upon which it rests, and where there is a
reasonable basis for the classification in view of the objects or purposes
to be accomplished. 22
In later decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court has specifically equated the
special legislation provision with the equal protection clause.2' 3 Thus, in
accordance with the foregoing equal protection analysis, 214 as well as the
traditional deference given to legislative classifications in special legislation
analysis,2 ' Public Act 84-7 does not appear to be special legislation in
violation of the Illinois Constitution. 216
212. Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 111-12, 281 N.E.2d 317, 322 (1972). Cf. Jones v.
State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 877, 555 P.2d 399, 417 (1976):
If, as asserted by appellants here, the Act in question is found to have been enacted
in response to a problem of statewide concern in Idaho and by alleviation of that
problem, is found to serve the health and welfare of the people of the state of Idaho,
and the means adopted in the Act are reasonably related to the solution of those
problems, then the Act will survive the challenge that it is offensive to [the special
legislation provision].
213. People v. Gurell, 98 111. 2d 194, 205-06, 456 N.E.2d 18, 23 (1983) (upholding consti-
tutionality of the Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 III. 2d
295, 313-15, 402 N.E.2d 560, 568-69 (1979) (upholding constitutionality of § 21.1 of Illinois
Limitations Act).
214. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
215. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 II1. 2d 295, 315, 402 N.E.2d 560, 569 (1979). See also
Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 385, 410-22 (1976);
Whalen & Wolf, Constitutional Law: The Prudence of Judicial Restraint Under the New Illinois
Constitution, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 63, 77-79 (1972); Comment, Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations as Special Legislation, 55 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 519 (1979).
216. Accord DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial, 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir.
1980) (panel statute consistent with Virginia special legislation provision). Cf. Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (attempt to limit recovery in medical
malpractice actions to $500,000 struck down on ground that it violated special legislation pro-
vision of Illinois Constitution). The Wright court relied on its earlier opinion in Grace v. Howlett,
51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), in which it invalidated a no-fault automobile insurance
plan limited to private vehicles. The court saw no basis for distinguishing its holding in Grace
that "to the extent that recovery is permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis a special privilege
is granted in violation of the Illinois Constitution." Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63
111. 2d 313, 329, 283 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976).
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VI. TRIAL By JURY
The fourteenth amendment does not guarantee the right to trial by jury
for civil suits tried in state courts.217 Article I, section 13 of the Illinois
Constitution, however, does provide such a guarantee: "The right of trial
by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate."2 ' This section, like
its predecessors in prior Illinois constitutions, preserves the right to a jury
trial as it existed at common law when the state's first constitution was
enacted.2 9 Hence, because they had the right at common law, medical
malpractice plaintiffs are entitled to have their claims heard and decided by
juries.2 0
As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained, any statute regulating the
right of trial by jury "should be liberally construed in favor of the right,
and the inclination of the court should be to protect and enforce the right." 2'
Yet, despite its recognition of a public policy favoring free access to the
courts,2 2 2 the Illinois Supreme Court has written:
217. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). See also Chicago
R.l. & Pac. R.R. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919) (states' almost limitless powers to govern use of
a jury in state civil suits).
218. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1970).
219. See Londrigan, Judge or Jury - Who Weighs the Evidence? 55 ILL. B.J. 732, 733-36
(1967). In George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 455, 47 N.E. 741, 743 (1897), the Illinois Supreme
Court wrote:
We do not think there is any substantial difference between the provisions incor-
porated in the three constitutions [of Illinois, adopted in 1818, 1848 and 18701. The
right of trial by jury was the same under one constitution as under the other. The
right protected by each constitution was the right of trial by jury as it existed at
common law.
In 1976, the court wrote:
This section [i.e., Article 1, section 13 of the 1970 Constitution] is the same as Article
II, section 5 of the 1870 Constitution except that it deletes an out-dated reference
to the office of justice of the peace, which has been abolished.
Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 11. 2d 313, 324, 347 N.E.2d 736, 740 (1976).
220. See Ritchey v. West, 23 I1. 329 (1860) (Abraham Lincoln appearing as counsel for the
defendant physician) (cited in Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 327, 347
N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976)), in which court noted that right to recover in jury trial for injuries
arising from medical malpractice existed at common law and was not creature of General As-
sembly.
221. Hudson v. Leverenz, l0 Ill. 2d 87, 93, 139 N.E.2d 255, 258 (1956) (quoting Morrison
Hotel & Rest. Co. v. Kirsner, 245 Ill. 431, 433, 92 N.E. 285, 286 (1910)). See also Hernandez
v. Power Constr. Co., 43 I1. App. 3d 860, 863, 357 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1976), aff'd, 73 Il1. 2d
90, 382 N.E.2d 1201 (1978):
The strong policy of this state as expressed in Article 1, section 13 of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 is to favor jury trials, and the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
that the power of the legislature to regulate the right of jury trial should be liberally
construed in favor of the right to a jury trial.
222. In 1984, the Illinois Appellate Court wrote, "The overriding public policy of Illinois is
that potential suitors should have free and unfettered access to the courts." Hutchinson v. Reaves,
126 Ill. App. 3d 87, 89, 466 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (1984). See also Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill.
19851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:345
The constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by jury is not so inelastic
as to render unchangeable every characteristic and specification of the
common-law jury system. Flexibility for the adjustment of details remains,
as long as the essentials of the system are retained.2 '
Consistent with that view, Illinois courts have upheld statutes and rules
which govern the time in which a jury demand may be made224 and the
procedure through which a jury may be selected. 25 The central issue here,
then, is whether Public Act 84-7 constitutes a reasonable limitation on the
right to trial by jury.
In Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association,126 the Illinois Supreme
Court found that a 1975 medical review statute127 violated the constitutional
right to trial by jury. Like Public Act 84-7, the 1975 statute required medical
malpractice litigants to proceed before a review panel consisting of a judge,
a physician and a lawyer as a condition precedent to a jury trial. 28 The 1975
statute also made the panel determination inadmissible at tria2 29 as does
Public Act 84-7.230 Unfortunately, the much distinguished23 ' and highly
criticized 23 2 Wright decision never identified the precise constitutional defi-
127, 135, 48 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1943) (court abused its discretion in denying late jury demand
when such demand "did not tend to inconvenience the court or parties litigant or prejudice any
rights in any manner whatsoever"). The right to trial by jury is important at the federal level
as well. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (defendant could not be
deprived of full jury trial in antitrust controversy); Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942)
(plaintiff entitled to submit to jury issue of whether his injury resulted from employer's neg-
ligence).
223. People v. Lobb, 17 III. 2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 331-32 (1959). See also Walker v.
New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) ("[Tlhe courts may not set aside any
legislative provision [dealing with jury trial procedure) ... because the form of action - the
mere manner in which questions are submitted - is different from that which obtained at the
common law"). Courts have limited the seventh amendment test in part to permit adoption of
modern forms of pleading and practice. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908).
224. Stephens v. Kasten, 383 111. 127, 133, 48 N.E.2d 508, 511 (1943) (upholding statute
requiring party to make affirmative and timely request in order to obtain jury trial and explaining
that "of necessity, the need for a systematic order of procedure requires that there be regulation
of the time when the right to a jury trial may be requested"). See also Hudson v. Leverenz, 10
111. 2d 87, 139 N.E.2d 255 (1956) (court did not abuse its discretion when, pursuant to statutory
authority, it refused jury demand first made only two weeks prior to trial).
225. People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 297-303, 161 N.E.2d 325, 331-34 (1959) (upholding Su-
preme Court Rule governing conduct of voir dire examination).
226. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
227. P.A. 79-960, § 58.8, 1975 i11. Laws 2888.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1018(d), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 16 (West).
231. Several courts, in upholding medical review panel statutes, have distinguished Wright as
resting on purely Illinois state constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
591 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.I I (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho Pharm., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 471
n.2 (E.D. La. 1979).
232. See supra note 7 1.
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ciency of the 1975 statute. Before reaching the jury trial issue, the court
already had invalidated the review panel procedure on the ground that it
violated constitutional separation-of-powers requirements.2 3 The finding that
the panel process violated the right to jury trial seemed to flow from the
court's earlier conclusion: "Because we have held that these statutes provid-
ing for medical review panels are unconstitutional [on separation-of-powers
grounds], it follows that the procedure prescribed therein as a prerequisite
to jury trial is an impermissible restriction on the right of trial by jury
.. '..34 This lack of clarity in reasoning prompted one commentator to
write:
It is difficult to understand how the jury trial argument contributes
anything to the court's earlier conclusion. If, as the court had concluded,
the Illinois procedure violated separation-of-powers principles, it was un-
constitutional regardless of its effect on the jury trial right. If, on the
other hand, the procedure did not violate another constitutional provision,
the court failed to articulate any independent basis for finding a violation
of the jury trial right. It is unfortunate that the court felt it necessary to
reach the jury trial question in a manner that at best causes confusion and
at worst stands as a precedent that may be taken beyond its seemingly
irrelevant use in Wright.2"
However elusive the reasoning in Wright may be, it is clear that the court
did not intend a blanket prohibition against all medical review panel statutes.
Immediately following its jury trial conclusion, the court wrote: "In so
holding, however, we do not imply that a valid pretrial panel procedure
cannot be devised." '2 - Several years later, the court reiterated the point:
"The critics have read Wright too broadly. . . . [Tihe case did not hold that
all statutory provisions creating panels for the review of malpractice claims
were unconstitutional. 237
In order to examine Public Act 84-7, it is necessary to provide a framework
for analyzing the constitutional right to trial by jury.24 Thus, we shall
examine how the review panel process affects the two elements of the jury
trial right: the right of the parties to present their cases before a jury239 and
the right to have a jury exercise its constitutional power to determine the
facts in controversy.214
233. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 323, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-40
(1976).
234. Id. at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
235. Redish, supra note 2, at 794.
236. See Wright, 63 III. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
237. Anderson v. Wagner, 79 II1. 2d 295, 304, 402 N.E.2d 560, 564 (1979).
238. For an analysis similar to the one that follows, see Lenore, supra note 170, at 420.
239. See infra notes 241-97 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 298-311 and accompanying text.
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A. Access to the Courts
l. Delay and Added Expense
While the review panel procedures do not preclude a jury trial on a medical
malpractice claim, they do delay the parties in reaching a jury and increase
the cost of those suits that go to trial.24" ' Appellate decisions recognize that
"reasonable restrictions prescribed by law ' 2 42 may be imposed on the right
of access to court so long as they are not so onerous as to make the right
"practically unavailable. ' 24 Although causing some judicial apprehension,2"
the delays and added expenses imposed by medical review panels have
generally been found to be not so substantial as to deny access. 245 The Illinois
Supreme Court should join the majority of courts that have reviewed similar
statutes and find that the review panel procedures contained in Public Act
84-7 do not, because of the pre-trial burdens they impose, deny medical
malpractice litigants access to the courts.
The imposition of procedural prerequisites to the exercise of the right to
trial by jury is within the state's power to regulate access to its judicial
system.2" Medical review panels resemble mandatory pretrial conferences, 247
which are imposed by statute in almost every state2 48 and have been upheld
241. Comment, First Checkup, supra note 2, at 681.
242. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976) (upholding Florida review panel
statute).
243. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wissler,
350 U.S. 858 (1955) (upholding mandatory pre-trial mediation procedure).
244. In upholding the Florida review panel statute, the Florida Supreme Court proclaimed
that "the pre-litigation burden cast upon the claimant reaches the outer limits of constitutional
tolerance." Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976). Justice England, in his con-
curring opinion, expressed concern "that persons who seek to bring malpractice lawsuits must
be put to the expense of two full trials of their claims, assuming the medical defendant chooses
to put plaintiff to her proof before the panel." Id. at 807. Significantly, because it makes panel
conclusions admissible at trial, the Florida panel statute is arguably more burdensome to mal-
practice claimants than is the panel procedure contained in Public Act 84-7. See infra notes 256-
74 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 n.16 (5th Cir. 1979); Carter
v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374,
382-91, 404 N.E.2d 585, 592-96 (1980); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 651-54, 369
N.E.2d 985, 989-90 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 103-06, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-
64 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 512-13, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444
(1978). But see infra notes 266-274 and accompanying text.
246. For example, courts have upheld statutes requiring an affirmative and timely request for
a jury, as opposed to a bench, trial. See, e.g., Odom v. Odom, 133 II. App. 2d 869, 272 N.E.2d
272 (5th Dist. 1971); Hayworth v. Bromwell, 239 Ind. 430, 158 N.E.2d 285 (1959).
247. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., FLA. R. Ctv. PRO. 1.200 (1985); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 218 (1983); IND.
TR. PRO. R. 16 (1985); MASS. R. CIv. PRO. 16 (1978); NEB. R. Civ. PRO. 16 (1985).
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as non-violative of the right to trial by jury.249 Significantly, the review panel
statute does not delay the filing of a suit, as did a divorce statute that was
held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Chris-
tiansen v. Connei.250 Rather, the review panel provisions are analogous to
"[divorce] statutes which require a lapse of a given period of time after the
filing of suit . before a final decree for divorce may be entered,"2 5' which
have been upheld. 252 In a prophetic discussion regarding the constitutional
bounds of the state's ability to limit the right of access, the court in
Christiansen wrote:
There are many areas of conflict and of litigation in which the participation
of a judge or mediator or counselor might be desirable. The volume of
personal injury litigation might be reduced, for example, or labor disputes
averted, by preliminary mediation before a judge. "
Medical review panels are the sort of reasonable limitation on the right
of access envisioned in Christiansen. In fact, the pre-trial burdens imposed
by the review panel process are accompanied by benefits to the litigants
which partially mitigate the negative impact of the procedure. As the Indiana
Supreme Court explained:
The participation by the parties in the panel process will satisfy to a great
extent their preparation needs. Such satisfaction will tend to reduce total
aggregate time for trial preparation. Thus, the delay complained of will
be offset to an appreciable extent. The cost to the party in whose favor
the opinion is rendered would be in the range that such party would expect
to pay to develop such evidence individually. And the cost to the party
against whom the opinion is rendered has been subjected to a cost by the
process which would be much the same as he expects to pay to discover
his opponent's evidence.1 4
Also, the delay occasioned by review panels will be relatively short because
the statute requires the panel procedure to be completed within 570 days, or
249. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Court of the Fifth Jud. Dist., 121 Mont. 320,
326-28, 194 P.2d 256, 260 (1948) (upholding statute prohibiting civil case from being set for
trial before pre-trial conference is held). See also Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187
U.S. 315 (1902) (requirement of preliminary hearing does not impermissibly infringe on seventh
amendment right to trial by jury).
250. 2 I1. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954).
251. Id. at 345, 118 N.E.2d at 268.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 348, 118 N.E.2d at 269. Immediately following this passage, the court wrote, "It
is arguable that the State should be able to make full use of its judiciary, wherever their services
might be valuable. But that result cannot be reached unless our constitutional doctrine of sep-
aration of powers is first altered." Id. For a discussion of the separation of powers issue, see
supra notes 56-85.
254. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 384, 404 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1980). Accord
Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981). In fact, it may be a constitutional
requirement that statements made during a panel proceeding be admissible at trial for impeach-
ment purposes. See Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981) (based on due process grounds).
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a little more than a year and a half.2"1 Given the typical backlog characteristic
of Illinois courts, the panel procedure should be completed during the time
in which the parties would normally be waiting for the case to be heard.
Although a statute may be constitutional in theory, it may prove to be
unconstitutional as applied. 26 Should the Illinois Supreme Court decide that
the nineteen-month statutory period for panel action25 7 does not deny a
medical malpractice plaintiff access to court, the court could later reverse
itself if, in practice, panel action consumes a longer period of time so as to
effectively deny access to the courts.2 58 To date, two state supreme courts
have reviewed statistical analyses of the operation of review panel statutes
and have found them to be unconstitutional.2 59 Additionally, at least one
commentator has urged that a third review panel statute be invalidated on
this ground. 260
Under the Florida Medical Mediation Act, the panel was required to hold
a final hearing within ten months from the date the claim was filed.26' Failure
to meet this ten-month limitation resulted in the panel losing jurisdiction
over the case, ' 62 with the parties, through no fault of their own, being forced
into court.263 Such loss of jurisdiction fell most heavily on the defendant,
who lost the benefits of the panel mediation process. Consequently, the
Florida Supreme Court held that application of this strict ten-month limi-
tation period was "arbitrary and capricious" and a violation of the defend-
255. See supra note 34.
256. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (review panel statute unconstitutional
as applied); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (review panel statute un-
constitutional as applied); Note, Constitutionality Re-Evaluated, supra note 161 (review panel
statute should be found unconstitutional as applied). Contra Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273
Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (review panel statute constitutional as written); Parker v. Chil-
dren's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978) (review panel statute constitutional as
written). One decision that upheld the constitutionality of a review panel act suggested that such
an act may be unconstitutional as applied. See Seoane v. Ortho Pharm., Inc., 660 F.2d 146,
151 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The legislation we review has not been shown to be unreasonable, either
on its face or as applied") (emphasis added).
257. A panel must render its decision no later than 570 days, or 19 months, after the parties
are at issue on the pleadings. P.A 84-7, § 2-1013, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3, at I I (West), provides
the following time limits: (I) the court shall order a panel convened no longer than 90 days
after the parties are at issue on the pleadings; (2) the panel shall convene within 120 days of
such order; (3) the panel shall render its decision within 180 days after convening; and (4) the
decision period may, upon the ruling of the judicial member, be extended up to a maximum of
180 days.
258. See supra note 43.
259. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980).
260. See Note, Constitutionality Re-Evaluated, supra note 161.
261. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 786.44(3) (West Supp. 1983).
262. "If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date the claim is filed, the
jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall terminate, and the parties may
proceed in accordance with the law." Id.
263. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 236 (Fla. 1980).
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ant's due process rights.2 6 Further, the court claimed that any extension of
the statutory time limitation would be an "effective denial of one's access
to the courts. '265 As a result of its inability to operate as legislatively
designed, the Florida act was held unconstitutional.
Two years after having declared the Pennsylvania Health Care Service
Malpractice Act constitutional, 266 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed
five years of statistical data concerning panel operations. 267 The court stated
that the excessive delays2 6 occasioned by the review process "are unconscion-
able and irreparably rip the fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and
effectiveness of our judicial system." 2 69 The court concluded that "the delays
involved in processing . . . claims under the . . .Act result in an oppressive
delay and impermissibly infringe upon the constitutional right to a jury.""210
While holding the act unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reaffirmed its faith in arbitration as "a viable, expeditious, alternative
method of dispute resolution." 27 ' The court claimed that its "conclusion
merely indicat[ed] the inability of this statutory scheme to provide an effective
alternative dispute resolution forum in the area of medical malpractice. 2 72
Perhaps multi-member review panels are inherently incapable of encouraging
prompt resolution of medical malpractice claims. As one commentator ob-
served:
There are several reasons for these delays. One of the major causes is the
panel member selection process. The system has failed to attract enough
willing panelists due to inadequate compensation. In addition, some non-
populous states have difficulty finding specialists in the field of health
care practicing within the state. There are concomitant problems of profes-
sional bias and friendship, failure of attorneys to complete discovery
procedures promptly and scheduling problems when all panelists are prac-
ticing professionals. -271
Only experience with Public Act 84-7 will provide the answer to whether
such delays can be avoided.27 4
264. Id. at 238.
265. Id.
266. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
267. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
268. Id. at 393-96, 421 A.2d at 194-95.
269. Id. at 396, 421 A.2d at 195.
270. Id. at 396, 421 A.2d at 196.
271. Id. (quoting Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 120, 394 A.2d 932, 939-
40).
272. Id. at 397, 421 A.2d at 196 (emphasis added).
273. Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and Trends, 17 F. 682,
688 (1982).
274. "[l]t is an accepted principle of constitutional law that deference to a coequal branch
of government requires that [courts] accord a reasonable period of ... time to test the effec-
tiveness of legislation." Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 387, 421 A.2d 190, 191 (1980) (quot-
ing Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 121, 394 A.2d 932, 940 (1978)).
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2. Cost-Shifting Provision
In contrast with the delays and added expenses associated with the review
panel procedure, the cost-shifting provision contained in Section 2-1019(c)
tends to, in the words of In re Smith, 271 make access to the courts "practically
unavailable. ' 2 6 Section 2-1019(c) provides that, when a party loses on the
issue of liability at trial after rejecting a unanimous panel determination,
"the trial court on motion of any prevailing party shall summarily tax to
the rejecting party the costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses of the
prevailing party incurred in connection with the review panel and the trial."1
277
The judge has no discretion in the assessment of these fees and costs. For
medical malpractice litigants who are subject to unanimous panel determi-
nations, the possibility of being taxed such fees and costs represents a
disincentive to proceed with a jury trial that is so substantial that it makes
the right of access practically unavailable.
These fees and costs are likely to average over $50,000 a case,2 78 and could
be as high as $500,000.79 Such an assessment potentially confronts each
malpractice plaintiff who is subject to a unanimous panel determination,
regardless of the merit of his claim.280 For example, a plaintiff who receives
a unanimous finding of liability may be dissatisfied with the damage assess-
ment. Because nobody can be certain of a trial's outcome the plaintiff
proceeds to court at substantial risk. The plight of a malpractice defendant
can be more serious. For example, a defendant may believe that a unanimous
panel overstated plaintiff's damages. To demand a jury trial will almost
inevitably cost this defendant plaintiff's fees and costs, since there is no
quarrel with the finding of liability. The review panel statute contains no
provision that allows a defendant, free of the cost-shifting section, to concede
liability and merely have a jury determine only the amount of damages.
As the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, "It]he constitution does not
guarantee to the citizen the right to litigate without expense, but simply
protects him from the imposition of such terms as unreasonably and inju-
riously interfere with his right to a remedy in the law. .... "28, Financial
burdens on the right to trial by jury, then, are constitutionally acceptable
so long as the financial imposition is reasonable. For example, Illinois courts
275. 381 Pa. 223, 122 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858
(1955).
276. Id. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629.
277. P.A. 84-7, § 2-1019(c), 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 17 (West) (emphasis added).
278. Bernier v. Burris, 85 CH 6625, Trial Court Finding No. B-3 (filed June 25, 1985), re-
printed in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1985, at 2.
279. Bernier v. Burris, 85 CH 6625, Trial Court Finding No. B-I (filed June 25, 1985), re-
printed in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1985, at 2.
280. Other cost-imposing statutes, by contrast, are effectuated only upon a finding that the
party's claim was without merit or that the challenged action was undertaken in bad faith. See
supra note 190.
281. Williams v. Gottschalk, 231 Il1. 175, 179, 83 N.E. 141, 142 (1907).
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have upheld a $10 fee for the filing of tax objections,2 2 a $50 fee for the
empanelling of a six-person jury,283 and a $100 fee for the empanelling of a
twelve-person jury.2 84 The Illinois Supreme Court has implied, however, that
jury demand fees so high "as to price a trial by jury out of the market"
unconstitutionally deny access to the courts. 215 In 1954 the court wrote:
"Thus, for example, were the legislature to pass a law conditioning the right
to petition for divorce upon the payment of a fee of $1,000, such a law
would, we believe, clearly . . . [violate] our constitution .... 1286
In In re Smith, the court used its "practical unavailability" test to uphold
the constitutionality of a mandatory pre-trial arbitration statute that required
a losing party to pay the costs of the arbitration proceeding before being
able to appeal to a trial de novo. 28 7 However, the court invalidated certain
fees that were so high as to preclude appeal.288 Significantly, the statute in
Smith involved only small claims. Review panels consider claims that are
much more expensive to litigate. Thus, the cost-shifting provision in Public
Act 84-7 constitutes a far weightier barrier to trial.
One potentially acceptable means of encouraging compliance with a review
panel determination is the bond requirement found in other medical review
panel statutes. However, such bond requirements have encountered dia-
metrical results when subjected to state constitutional review. A Massachu-
setts law provides a judge with the discretion to impose, as a precondition
to trial, a bond of $2,000 or higher for those cases the medical review panel
finds have no merit.289 While he may fix a lower amount if the plaintiff is
indigent, he may not eliminate the bond requirement. 2 90 Significantly, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court did not find the bond requirement to constitute
an unconstitutional denial of access for the indigent because of the wide
discretion granted to the judge.29' As originally enacted, Arizona's review
282. Sanko v. Carlson, 69 111. 2d 246, 249-50, 371 N.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). Cf. United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (statutory requirement of payment of filing fees as condition prec-
edent to obtaining discharge in bankruptcy has rational basis and does not deny indigents equal
protection of law).
283. People ex rel. Flanagan v. McDonough, 24 I1. 2d 178, 180 N.E.2d 486 (1962) ($50 fee
for six-person jury and $100 fee for twelve-person jury upheld as reasonable). See also Fried v.
Danaher, 46 Ill. 2d 475, 479, 263 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1970) ($50 jury demand fee upheld as rea-
sonable and not arbitrary).
284. People ex rel. Flanagan v. McDonough, 24 Ill. 2d 178, 180 N.E.2d 486 (1962).
285. Id. at 181, 180 N.E.2d at 487.
286. People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 342, 118 N.E.2d 262, 267 (1954)
(struck down mandatory waiting period before filing of complaint seeking annulment).
287. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub noma. Smith v. Wissler,
350 U.S. 858 (1955).
288. Id. at 232-33, 112 A.2d at 630. Here the court found unconstitutional the requirement
that a losing party pay the fees of the arbitrators where the fees totaled $225 in a case involving
less than $500.
289. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 1980).
290. Id.
291. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 651-54, 369 N.E.2d 985, 990 (1977).
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panel statute similarly required a plaintiff wishing to proceed to court after
an adverse panel decision to post a $2,000 bond payable to the defendant
for his costs and fees should the plaintiff not prevail at trial. 9 The same
bond applied to a defendant proceeding to trial following a panel determi-
nation favoring the plaintiff.9 3 Upon motion, an Arizona judge could reduce
the bond amount if the party required to post the bond was found to be
indigent, "or upon other just cause," but he could not eliminate the bond
requirement. 294 Unlike its Massachusetts counterpart, the Arizona Supreme
Court found this last requirement to be a denial of the indigent's constitu-
tional right of access to the court.2 95 Subsequently, the Arizona legislature
amended its medical review panel statute to eliminate the bond requirement. 2 9
A similar bond requirement in Illinois, waivable entirely for the indigent,
would certainly constitute a far smaller burden on the right to access than
does the cost-shifting provision contained in Section 2-1019(c) and could
potentially be found constitutional.
B. Factual Determination by a Jury
As one reviewing court succinctly stated, "[tihe gravamen of the right to
jury trial is that a party asserting a claim is entitled to have a jury be the
final arbiter of the facts in dispute." 97 In determining whether statutes
affecting the operation of jury trials abridge the right of trial by jury, courts
have formulated a test which differentiates between the form and the sub-
stance of the right.2 9 As Justice Brandeis explained in an opinion approving
292. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (I) (1982).
293. Id. § 12-567 (J) (1982).
294. Id. § 12-567 (K) (1982).
295. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 586, 570 P.2d 744, 753 (1977).
296. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 el seq. (1985 Cum. Supp.).
297. Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1175 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981). In People v. Lobb, 17 Ill.
2d 287, 298, 161 N.E.2d 325, 331 (1959), the Illinois Supreme Court echoed this sentiment:
The right of trial by jury as it existed at common law is the right to have the facts
in controversy determined, under the direction and superintendence of a judge, by
the unanimous verdict of twelve impartial jurors who possess the qualifications and
are selected in the manner prescribed by law.
298. The Illinois Supreme Court has written:
The constitutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury is not so inelastic as to
render unchangeable every characteristic and specification of the common-law jury
system. Flexibility for the adjustment of detail remains, as long as the essentials of
the system are retained.
People v. Lobb, 17 Il1. 2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 332 (1959). In People v. Schoos, 399 Ill.
527, 536, 78 N.E.2d 245, 249-50 (1948), the court elaborated:
The essential requirements of a trial by jury at common law and preserved by the
constitution are that there must be twelve impartial and qualified jurors, selected in
the manner required by law, who shall unanimously decide the facts in controversy
under the direction and superintendence of a judge .... The constitutional provision
is not so inelastic, on the other hand, as to render unchangeable every characteristic
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the use of auditors in complex cases to narrow the issues of fact for a jury
and to express opinions on those facts:
The command of the Seventh Amendment that "the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved" does not require that old forms of practice and
procedure be retained. It does not prohibit the introduction of new methods
for determining what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the
introduction of new rules of evidence. Changes in these may be made.
New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs
and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration of justice.
Indeed, such changes are essential to the preservation of the right. The
limitation imposed by the amendment is merely that enjoyment of the
right of trial by jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination
of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered with.2-
Thus, if the review panels do not interfere with the jury's ability to resolve
all issues of fact in medical malpractice trials, this second element of the
jury trial right is not infringed.
The review panel process contained in Public Act 84-7 in no way interferes
with this important jury function because the panel reports are inadmissible
at trial.)° However, if the cost-shifting section is ruled unconstitutional, 10
the General Assembly might consider making panel reports admissible. This
would provide a substitute incentive for litigants to comply with panel
determinations and thereby help to effectuate the statutory goal of encour-
aging early settlements and dismissals of medical malpractice claims. 02 Ad-
ditionally, the admissibility of panel determinations "will add more credibility
to the review process, thereby causing the litigants to take the process more
seriously and come to the panel better prepared." 3
Such an admissibility rule, however, arguably infringes upon the power
of a jury to determine the facts. Parties against whom panel determinations
are rendered might claim that introduction of the panel findings is so
prejudicial as to preclude a jury from making an independent assessment of
the medical malpractice claim, even though the panel report is to be given
and detail of the common-law system.
Using this framework, the Illinois courts have upheld numerous statutes affecting the trial of a
suit by jury. See, e.g., People v. Lobb, 17 III. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959) (upholding Supreme
Court rule governing conduct of voir dire examination); People ex rel. Denny v.
Traeger, 372 !11. 11, 22 N.E.2d 679 (1939) (upholding statute directing county jury commissioners
to include women on jury rolls); People v. Kelly, 347 111. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931) (upholding
statute prohibiting trial judge from expressing opinions on facts to jury).
299. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-310 (1920). Accord Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897) (quoted with approval in People v. Kelly, 347 III. 221, 225, 179
N.E. 898, 900 (1932)).
300. See supra note 30.
301. See supra notes 177-190, 275-295 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 9.
303. See Note, Constitutionality Re-Evaluated, supra note 161, at 514. See also Alexander,
State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in Federal Diversity Action, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 959,
971 (1979).
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only "such weight as the jury ...chooses to ascribe it."" 4 As a New York
trial court, in holding that state's review panel statute unconstitutional,
reasoned:
Determinations of physician negligence virtually always involve the reso-
lution of technical and complex factual issues. Couched in medical ter-
minology and buttressed on either side by expert evidence, the burden on
the petit juror to decipher and absorb such information is substantial.
Enter now a recommendation with respect to liability of a panel composed
of the most highly respected members of the community which has pre-
digested the complexities and technicalities of the case. While not wishing
to impute to the petit jury an active abdication of its prerogatives, one is
inexorably led to the conclusion that the jurors will be passively drawn to
adopt this prize panel's recommendation. '0
The New York Appellate Court disagreed, rejecting the "assumption that
no jury could evaluate a medical malpractice panel's recommendation with
objectivity, or follow a trial court's instruction regarding the weight to be
given it." 3° Rather, the court found that the "[niet effect of the statute...
has been to furnish the jury in a medical malpractice action with the opinion
of an expert panel." 3°7 Reviewing courts in several states have opined that,
with proper instructions by the court as to the weight to be given a panel
finding, the determination becomes no more than an item of evidence to be
considered by the jury. 0 8 The New Yort Court of Appeals recently wrote:
304. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (8) (McKinney 1984). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21
(c) (Page 1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (1985 Cum. Supp).
305. Comiskey v. Arlen (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding New York review panel statute un-
constitutional), rev'd, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dept. 1976). See also Beatty v.
Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 498, 424 N.E.2d 586, 595 (1981) (Brown, J., dissenting)
("Clearly, the arbitration panel was designed as a check on the jury ... As such, it suggests a
lack of faith in the fairness of jury verdicts ...[and therefore] is prohibited by our state con-
stitution").
306. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 307, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (1976).
307. Id. at 315, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 130. Accord Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 581, 570
P.2d 744, 749 (1977) ("In essence, the panel's finding constitutes an expert opinion which the
jury may hear, evaluate, accept or reject just as it would any other expert opinion").
308. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 488, 424 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1981) ("For
if the trial court instructs the jury with clarity and simplicity, their true roles as the exclusive
finders of fact will prevail. . . . With the proper instructions by the court, there could be no
constitutional infirmity to contaminate the purity of the jurors' prerogatives"). Accord Seoane
v. Ortho Pharm., Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981) (Louisiana statute). Regarding the possible
defendant bias of review panel determinations, one court wrote, "[I]f there is a risk that a panel
opinion will favor a health care provider . . . simply by reason of the makeup of the panel, the
jury can be made aware of it through articulate and imaginative advocacy." Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 385, 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (1980). See also Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915) (provisions of Interstate Commerce Act, which make
findings contained in Commission orders prima facie evidence of facts therein stated in suits to
enforce reparations awards, does not infringe right of trial by jury); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S.
300 (1920) (court-imposed requirement of preliminary examination by auditor in complex ac-
counting cases, with auditor's findings admissible, not violative of seventh amendment).
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"The role of the medical malpractice mediation panel is to assist - not
supplant - the trier of fact in reaching a verdict." 3°9 One cannot presume
that jurors will abdicate their role as triers of fact because, as the Ohio
Supreme Court has noted:
Historically, jurors for the most part have proven their independence.
They guard their roles with a unique jealousy. They accept with obvious
pride the admonitions of the trial court that they are "sole judges of the
facts."1"0
CONCLUSION
Public Act 84-7 was enacted in response to the purported crisis in the
medical malpractice insurance market. The Act establishes a review panel
procedure designed to encourage prompt disposal of medical malpractice
suits and thereby reduce the cost and consumption of time associated with
the litigation of such claims in court. Declared unconstitutional by a state
trial judge, the panel procedure is now before the Illinois Supreme Court
for constitutional review.
Medical review panels do not violate the Judicial Article of the Illinois
Constitution. Because panel members are compensated out of funds which
are appropriated by the legislature and not collected from the litigants as
fees, they are not fee officers. Also, because review panels are not empowered
to issue and enforce final judgments, the panel process does not vest judicial
power in non-judges, and subsequent court proceedings do not constitute
trials de novo. In short, the panel process is not a "trial substitute"; it is
mandatory pretrial procedure that is closely akin to the familiar settlement
conference.
Review panels do not deprive litigants of their due process rights because
(1) states are accorded great latitude to establish and alter procedures which
govern access to their courts for the resolution of civil claims, and (2) a
medical malpractice claimant has no property interest in preexisting proce-
dures for enforcing his common-law right to a remedy. The contention that
panels will be biased due to the presence of the physician member must be
rejected as speculative.
The panel process should be found to comport with equal protection
guarantees if the Illinois Supreme Court employs the rational basis standard;
however, if a means-scrutiny test is used, the cost-shifting section will likely
fail. That particular provision is not "wholly irrelevant" to the achievement
of the purposes underlying Public Act 84-7, but it is not "substantially
related" to those legislative goals because not all portions of the review
panel provisions constitute special legislation under the Illinois Constitution.
309. Treyball v. Clark, No. 516 slip. op. (N.Y. Ct. App., Sept. 12, 1985).
310. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 488, 424 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1981).
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In general, the panel process does not violate the right to trial by jury
because it is a reasonable limitation on that right. Panel-imposed delays and
expenses are relatively modest, and litigants retain the right to have a jury
as the final arbiter of fact. The cost-shifting provision, however, does violate
the jury trial right because, due to the size of the fees and costs that may
be assessed, it makes the right practically unavailable for litigants who are
subject to unanimous panel determinations.
Thus, with the exception of the cost-shifting section, the review panel
procedure contained in Public Act 84-7 should be upheld as constitutional.
It is noteworthy that Illinois courts have become increasingly receptive to
non-court alternatives to dispute resolution."' In fact, the Illinois Judicial
Conference this year successfully sought passage of a measure to allow the
Illinois Supreme Court to establish a program of mandatory arbitration for
cases in which the disputed amount does not exceed $15,000.32 Regardless
of such public policy considerations, the issue before the Illinois Supreme
Court is the constitutionality, not the social wisdom, of Public Act 84-7.1'1
311. Burleigh, Justice by Arbitration in Illinois, ILL. ISSUES 16 (Nov. 1985).
312. P.A. 84-844, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 12, at 338 (West).
313. See Treyball v. Clark, No. 516 (N.Y. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1985) (upholding medical mal-
practice statute) ("For the correction of alleged deficiencies in the statutory scheme, plaintiff's
'appeal lies to the ballot and to the legislative processes of government, not to the courts' ");
Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 III. 167, 172, 125 N.E. 748, 750
(1919) (upholding statute) (in reviewing constitutionality of act, "neither the motive nor the
wisdom of the General Assembly is ever questioned"). See also Redish, supra note 2, at 763;
Comment, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 1285,
1286 (1976).
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of several provisions of the Medical
Malpractice Reform Act in Bernier v. Burris, No. 62876 (March 1986). The court used the
rational basis test to determine if the challenged provisions violated the equal protection or due
process guarantees of the United States and Illinois constitutions and if some of the provisions
constituted special legislation in violation of the Illinois Constitution. The court struck down
only the provisions setting out the procedures for review panels, ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 110,
§§ 2-1012 - 2-1020, as vesting judicial authority in the non-judicial members of the panel. Id.
at 7. Justice Ryan, in a separate opinion, disagreed, arguing that the jury trial has traditionally
vested the fact-finding process in non-judicial personnel. Id. at 22-23 (Ryan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The court upheld the constitutionality of the provisions for periodic
payment of damages, §§ 2-1701 - 2-1719; the modification of the collateral source rule, § 2-
1205; the prohibition of punitive damages, § 2-1115; and the sliding scale for contingent fees
that an attorney may charge for representing a plaintiff in a malpractice suit. Id. at 10-21.
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